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1. INTRODUCTION
Since 1989, at least eleven Eastern European countries
have considered major initiatives to reverse the
nationalizations of state socialism by returning property or
paying compensation to former owners.' The names given
such measures-restitution, compensation, or reprivatization-
reflect their aim to restore an original state of private
ownership.' Reprivatization initiatives so far have promised
to redistribute property valued at over $50 billion.'
This article examines reprivatization in the Czech
Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland. These four countries
have developed their programs with close regard for one
another's example.4 Despite their common goal of redressing
* J.D. 1992, Harvard University; B.A. 1988, Princeton University. The
author is a Ford Foundation Fellow in Public International Law at Harvard
Law School. I am very grateful to Yitzhak Brudny, Abram Chayes, Charles
Fried, Duncan Kennedy, Angelia K. Means, Marek A. Nowicki, Leopold
Specht, Michael Stewart, Agnes Szent-Ivany, Vladimira Zakova, the law
firms of Patzak, Specht & Krauss (Vienna), Eorsi & Partners (Budapest),
and Kriz, Belina & Partners (Prague) for their invaluable help. I thank
every one of my sources for sharing their knowledge and insights with me,
usually on no notice. The opinions and mistakes found in this article are,
of course, mine alone.
1 The countries are Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Germany,
Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, the Czech Republic and Slovakia (as
parts of the former federal republic).
• I will use the broadest term, "reprivatization," for all such measures.
• These figures include in-kind, capital voucher and cash transfers, as
well as administrative costs to the state where available.
' See Papers Warn Against Too Extensive Return of Property, CTK
National Newswire, Feb. 12, 1991, available in LEXIS, World Library,
ALLWLD File; President Walesa Interviewed on Current Unrest and Support
for Government, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Jan. 14, 1992,
available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File; Smallholders Oppose
Property Restitution Bill, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Dec. 13, 1990,
available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File; see also Anthony
Robinson, Survey of Employee Ownership, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1992, at 16.
Another important model for these countries was the German
reprivatization program, the oldest in Central Europe. My discussion
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takings by deposed governments, the programs differ in form,
scope and spirit.
After the Czech and Slovak federation collapsed in late
1992, its successors, the Czech and Slovak Republics, have
proceeded to implement the main tenets of the federal
restitution program, returning land, buildings and objects in
kind. However, restitution momentum is stronger in the
Czech Republic than in Slovakia, where nationalist politicians
have opposed the federal program from the start. At the other
end of the spectrum, Hungary has granted former owners
near-nominal compensation in capital vouchers. Poland has
been debating bills which fit somewhere between the
Hungarian and Czech alternatives since 1990. While the
latest bill was pending in the Polish legislature last spring,
President Walesa, in the midst of a government crisis,
suspended the parliament and called for general elections.
These elections were held in September, 1993 and the
Democratic Left Alliance, a left of center coalition comprised
of former communists, has gained power. Former communists
have traditionally opposed reprivatization. Their election
likely signals a major setback for all initiatives.
The first part of this article discusses the legislative
histories of these initiatives and suggests reasons for the
excludes the German program because the reunification context sets it
legally and politically apart from other programs in the region.
The references noted below will provide the reader with a basic outline
of the German program. Property restitution provisions were part of the
reunification treaty and were later incorporated into the German
constitution. Restitution claims form a large part of all business at the
Treuhandanstalt, the state agency charged with privatization. See, e.g.,
Dorothy Ames Jeffress, Resolving Rival Claims on East German Property
Upon German Unification, 101 YALE L.J. 527 (1991) (describing the legal
mechanism of German reprivatization). For accounts of the political and
social context of German restitution see, e.g., Bonn Expects Compensation
for Nationalized Assets in GDR, WEEK IN GERMANY, Apr. 6, 1990; Dear Sir,
Your House is Mine, THE ECONOMIST, June 9, 1990, at 51; Alexander
Ferguson, East German Businessman Struggles to Win Back Company,
Reuter Library Report, Nov. 16, 1990, available in LEXIS, World Library,
ALLWLD File; Marc Fisher, Germans Find a House is Not a Home;
Agreement Allows 'Westies' to Reclaim Property in the East, WASH. POST,
July 25, 1990, at A15; Germans May Reclaim Land in East, S.F. CHRON.,
Mar. 7, 1991, at A21; Ferdinand Protzman, Plucking Gems From German
Ashes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1991, § D at 1; Christian Schubert, Ex-E.





differences among them. These differences result from the
diverse circumstances of the 1989 transitions, the various
economic conditions and the dissimilar distribution of the
largely similar new political forces.5  The second part
compares the legal mechanisms of reprivatization in the
former Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (CSFR), Hungary
and Poland. The third part of the article attempts to
synthesize the available information about the distributive
impact of the initiatives.
Even in the countries which have reprivatization laws, it
is too early to evaluate their effect: many claims filed today
will take decades to resolve and the majority will take at least
several years. The cost and impact projections prepared for
parliamentary debates all contain multi-billion-dollar error
margins. This article argues that the distributive impact of
reprivatization either will be minimal, or will bear little
resemblance to the goals articulated in the laws and the public
debates of their passage. The conclusion suggests that
reprivatization is a creature of succession politics and that its
primary function is ideological. Extremely popular despite
their uncertain economic significance, reprivatization
initiatives offer insights into the nation-building agendas of
the governments which preside over them.
2. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF REPRIVATIZATION EFFORTS
IN THE CZECH AND SLOVAK REPUBLICS,
HUNGARY AND POLAND
2.1. Introduction
Immediately following the collapse of the Peoples'
Republics in 1989, the new governments of Czechoslovakia,
Hungary and Poland came under pressure to enact measures
to return nationalized property.' The arguments used for and
r Cf. Laszlo Bruszt & David Stark, Remaking the Political Field in
Hungary: From the Politics of Confrontation to the Politics of Competition,
in EASTERN EUROPE IN REVOLUTION 13, 16 (Ivo Banac ed., 1992) ("'e year
1989 was one not of Transition in Eastern Europe but of a plurality of
transitions with diverse paths to different types of political institutions.").
' See e.g., Grzegorz Cydejko, Reprivatization; To Give or Not to Give, The
Warsaw Voice, Apr. 21, 1991, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD
File; Interview with Wojtciech Goralczyk, Vice-Minister of Privatisation,
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against reprivatization in the Czech lands, Slovakia, Hungary
and Poland were remarkably similar. Particularly against the
background of these similar arguments, the difference in the
results is striking: from all-out restitution in the Czech and
Slovak Republics, to partial compensation in Hungary, to no
law thus far in Poland. Such different outcomes reflect the
political, economic, and historical circumstances in which the
reprivatization debates took place. These settings are outlined
below, following a brief chronology of reprivatization
initiatives in the region.
The central argument in this part of the article is that the
likelihood of passing strong restitution measures varies
inversely with the strength of the left and the technocrats in
the political arena. In turn, the relative strength of the left in
East-Central Europe is largely a function of the manner of
each country's transition from state socialism. The influence
of the technocrats is the strongest where popular awareness of
a country's economic problems is high.
2.2. Regional Chronology Of Reprivatization Initiatives
The first reprivatization law, the Small Federal Restitution
Law, was enacted in the CSFR on October 2, 1990.7 Its scope
was limited to reversing certain nationalizations of the late
1950s. Two sweeping Czech and Slovak laws and one
Hungarian law followed in early 1991, respectively, the Large
Federal Restitution Law, the Federal Land Law, and the First
Polish News Bulletin, Sept. 1, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library,
ALLWLD File [hereinafter Goralczyk Interview]; Tibor Szendrei, Back to the
Drawing Board, July 1991, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD
File; Interview with Jan Sokol, Vice-President of the House of Nations
[Senate] of the Czech and Slovak National Assembly, Prague, Czech
Republic, Mar. 24, 1992 [hereinafter Sokol Interview]; Interview with Jan
Urban, Political Commentator for the daily Lidove Noviny, Prague, Czech
Republic, Mar. 24, 1992 [hereinafter Urban Interview];
Some of the new political parties made reprivatization a campaign issue
in the first post-communist elections. See, e.g., Hungarian Property Rights
Debate, East European Markets, Feb. 8, 1991, available in LEXIS, World
Library, ALLWLD File; Szendrei, supra.
7 Law of 2 October 1990 on Mitigation of the Consequences of Certain
Property Losses, No. 403/1990 Coll. of L. as amended by the Law of 30
October 1990, No. 458/1990 Coll. of L. (effective Nov. 1, 1990) (U.S. Dep't
of State Translation) [hereinafter Small Federal Restitution Law]. I am





In the spring of 1992, Hungary passed two additional
compensation laws, the first of which redresses property
deprivations and is known as the Second Compensation Law.
The second initiative primarily concerns political persecution.'
" The Law on Extrajudicial Rehabilitation, No. 87/1991 Coll. of L., of Feb.
22, 1991, translated in U.S. Dep't of Commerce Central & Eastern Europe
Legal Texts, Mar. 1991, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File,
(effective Apr. 1, 1991) [hereinafter Large Federal Restitution Law]. The
Large Federal Restitution Law sanctions restitution and compensation of
most property nationalized since 1948 except that which is governed by the
Small Federal Restitution Law (1d., art. 35) or The Czech and Slovak Act of
May 21, 1991 on the Regulation of the Relations of Ownership of Land and
Other Agrarian Property, No. 101/1991 Coll. of L., of May 21, 1991,
translated in U.S. Dep't of Commerce Central & Eastern European Legal
Texts, May 21, 1991, available in LEXIS, World Library ALLWLD File
(effective on publication) [hereinafter Federal Land Law]. The Federal
Land Law sanctions restitution and compensation for land and agricultural
property. Id., art. 35. In addition to restitution and compensation matters,
the Federal Land Law regulates all agricultural land ownership in the
country. It supersedes all previous land reform legislation. Id., art. 32.
Law XXV of 1991, On Partial Compensation for Damages Unlawfully
Caused by the State to Properties Owned by Citizens in the Interest of
Settling Ownership Relations (enacted Apr. 24, 1991, as amended June 26,
1991), translated in Hungarian Rules of Law in Force IIJ16 1127-45 (1991)
[hereinafter First Compensation Law] (effectuated by Government Decree
104/1991, Aug. 3, 1991). In the Interest of Settling Ownership Relations,
and on the Execution [of] Act XXV of 1991 on Partial Compensation for
Damages Unlawfully Caused by the State, translated in Hungarian Rules
of Law in Force II./21 1640-57 (1991) [hereinafter First Compensation
Decree]. The First Compensation Decree regulates compensation for most
property nationalized since 1949.
'Act XXIV of 1992, To Regulate Property Ownership, On the Partial
Compensation for the State's Confiscation of Citizens' Property Pursuant To
The Enforcement Of Laws Passed Between 1 May 1 1939 and 8 June 1949,
1992 U.S. Dep't of Commerce Central and Eastern Europe Legal Texts, May
8, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library; EELEG File (enacted Apr. 7,
1992; effective May 7, 1992) [hereinafter Second Compensation Law]. Law
XXXII of 1992, On Compensation for Citizens Who Had Unlawfully Lost
Their Life or Liberty for Political Reasons, enacted June 2, 1992 [hereinafter
Third Political Compensation Law]. I am grateful to Juraj Strasser and
Katalin Furedi for providing me with a translation of this law. See
Compensation Legislation Completed in Hungary, MTI Hungarian News
Agency, May 13, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File;
Law on Political Compensation to go into Effect on Thursday, Agence France
Presse, July 1, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALJLWLD File;
Property Seizure Compensation to Be Paid to Over One Million People, BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts, May 13, 1992, available in LEXIS, World
Library, ALLWLD File.
The problem of redressing non-property related injustices and political
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At about the same time, the Czech Republic (then still part
of a federal state) passed a law returning some of the property
confiscated under 1945 decrees from ethnic Germans and
Hungarians, the Czech Restitution Law.'0 Last July, the
Slovak Republic passed an amendment to its land legislation,
which appears to address some ethnic Hungarian restitution
claims in a fashion similar to that of the Czech Restitution
Law." After the split of the CSFR, the successor republics
have continued to implement the provisions of the federal
program with few modifications.
The first Polish reprivatization bill originated in the Senate
in 1990, but was withdrawn before the first reading, in part
due to the lack of cost and scope estimates. In the late spring
of 1991, Poland's Presidential Office and the government's
Ministry of Ownership Transformations (privatization
authority) submitted two competing reprivatization bills to the
Parliament. The Ministry's bill, the 1991 Government Bill,
prevailed in the readings, but it lapsed in early 1992 without
being passed. At least three very different bills were
introduced in the first half of 1992; only one of the three
survived until the end of that year. That bill, the Coalition of
Three Bill, came from a moderate legislative coalition and was
substantially similar to the 1991 Government Bill.'" In
persecution, which is the subject of the Third Political Compensation Law,
is beyond the scope of this article. Suffice it to say that this problem is
often impossible to separate from issues ofreprivatization, and it invariably
complicates policy debates. Consider the following remarks by Poland's
Vice-Minister of Privatization on the difficulty of crafting a reprivatization
bill: "[Tihe reprivatization bill has been perceived very much as an engine
meant to 'tow' claims of entirely different nature, including pension claims."
Goralczyk Interview, supra note 6. Cf. Large Federal Restitution Law, art.
32.
, Law No. 243 of the Czech National Assembly, Apr. 15, 1992, Zbierka
Zakonov c. 243/1992 [hereinafter Czech Restitution Law]. I am grateful to
Juraj Strasser for providing me with the text of this law.
" Coalition Talks Ignore Serious Problems Like Agriculture-MOS, CTK
National News Wire, July 22, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library,
ALLWLD File. The text of the amendment is not available in this country.
In the absence of detailed press reports, this article refrains from discussing
this law in any depth.
1 The coalition parties were the KLD (Liberal Democratic Congress), the
UD (Democratic Union) and the PPG (Polish Economic Program). See
Goralczyk Interview, supra note 6; see also Polish Government Program For
Privatization of Polish Economy (as proposed by the Government and




February 1993, the new government of Prime Minister Hanna
Suchocka introduced its own reprivatization bill, the Suchocka
Government Bill."' The Suchocka Government Bill met with
considerable approval and, having apparently displaced all
competition, was alone awaiting the Parliament's vote before
a major government crisis struck last spring. The crisis,
culminating in a no-confidence vote for the Suchocka
government, resulted in President Walesa's suspension of the
Parliament, including all legislative activity concerning
reprivatization until the September, 1993 general election at
the earliest.' The Democratic Left Alliance pledges to
available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File [hereinafter 1991
Government Bill]; Government Discusses Plans For Privatisation and
Reprivatisation, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Mar. 12, 1992,
available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File; Interview with Andrzej
Artur Czynczyk, Boston, MA, Apr. 11, 1992 [hereinafter Czynczyk
Interview]; Cydejko, supra note 6.
"s For reports of this bill, see Deputy Minister on Conditions for
Restoration of Nationalised Properties, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts,
Feb. 12, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File; Poland:
Draft Reprivatisation Law Prepared, Reuter Textine, Jan. 30, 1993,
available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File; Poland Draws Up Plans
to Return Seized Property, Reuters, Feb. 15, 1993, available in LEXIS,
World Library, ALLWLD File; Poland Outlines Reprivatisation Plans,
Reuter Library Report, Feb. 15, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library,
ALLWLD File; Preparations for Reprivatization Underway, PAP News Wire,
Feb. 15, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File;
Reprivatization Law on Home Stretch, Finance East Europe, Feb. 18, 1993,
available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File; Returned to Owner,
Polish News Bulletin, June 4, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library,
ALLWLD File; Some Reprivatization Claims Could Be Invalidated, Finance
East Europe, Dec. 17, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD
File; To Whom 250 Trillion Zloty, Polish News Bulletin, Feb. 16, 1993,
available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File; Bogdan Turek, Former
Owners to Recover Property Under Government Plan, UPI, Feb. 15, 1993,
available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File.
14 See e.g., Poland: A Carry-On, ECONOMIST, June 5, 1993, at 53.
For a history of the recent bills, see Council of Ministers Meets, Polish
News Bulletin, July 14, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD
File; Deputies Present Reprivatisation Bill, Polish News Bulletin, Apr. 13,
1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File; Goralczyk
Interview, supra note 6; New Restitution Proposals; East European Business
Law, May, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File;
Parliament Affairs in Brief; Sejm Session Reviews Amendments to Patents,
Banking and Tax Law, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Nov. 4, 1992,
available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File; Pawlak Addresses Sejm,
Polish News Bulletin, July 2, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library,
ALLWLD File; Poland: Country Hopes for Second Chance on Privatisation
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maintain economic reform without so-called "shock therapy."
The change in Parliamentary leadership suggests that the pace
of privatization, and especially reprivatization, will most likely
decline. In anticipation of a law, Poland's ministries,
provincial governments, courts and organizations have
received up to 200,000 claims from former owners."5
2.3. Political Setting Of Reprivatization
Reprivatization debates in East-Central Europe generally
pitted nationalist-right majorities against the left and the
technocrats. Radical proponents favored restitution in kind of
all property to former owners or their heirs, with a
substitution of property or cash compensation for altered or
lost items. Some suggested compensation for government use
and even lost profits. Restitution advocates pressed for
suspending privatization until all claims are settled, and
accused their technocrat and leftist adversaries of blocking
and Foreign Investment, Reuter Textline: Guardian, Aug. 1, 1992, available
in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File; Poland's Privatization Programme
Jeopardised by Cash Flow Problems, Reuters Textline: Euromoney Central
European, Apr. 1, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File;
Poles Must Pay, Says Ministry, Privatisation International, May, 1992,
available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File; Reprivatisation Debate,
Polish News Bulletin, May 5, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library,
ALLWLD File; Re-privatization Bill Ready Soon, Finance East Europe, Mar.
5, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File; Sejm Discusses
Draft Laws on Reprivatisation, VAT, PAP Polish Press Agency, July 1, 1992,
available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File.
" For widely varying estimates, see Brief Mix, PAP Polish News Agency,
Sept. 25, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALILWLD File; Piotr
Buczek and Zdzislaw Grzedzinski, Outside the Exchange, WARSAW VOICE,
June 7, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File; Demand
for Restitution of Confiscated Property in Warsaw, BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, Aug. 13, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD
File; Lawsuits Connected with Economic Activity Prevail in Courts, PAP
News Wire, Aug. 11, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD
File; Poland: Compensation for Confiscated Property Could Cost Z
200,OOOBN, Reuter Textline, May 26, 1992, available in LEXIS, World
Library, ALLWLD File; Poland: Reprivatisation Law Drafted, Reuter
Textline: Euromoney Central European, Sept. 1, 1992, available in LEXIS,
World Library, ALLWLD File; Reprivatization Claims Total 15 BN Dollars,
PAP Polish News Agency, May 23, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library,
ALLWLD File; Dariusz Styczek, New Private Ownership Laws: Return to
the Past, WARSAW VOICE, Mar. 1, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library,
ALLWLD File; Bogdan Turek, Law on Confiscated Property Delayed, UPI,




national rebirth and "moral purification.""
In contrast, the left and technocrat opponents have
generally resisted all forms of reprivatization. The left has
fought against the restoration of property for they see it as a
resurrection of a questionable distributive scheme. The
technocrats fear the destabilization of already uncertain
property regimes, the consequent loss of foreign investment,
and a general proliferation of claims on governments, courts
and administrative authorities which cannot be sustained
based upon even the most generous forecasts.' Both the left
and the technocrats accuse reprivatizers of trying to "satisfy
their doubtful political ambitions [and] create a layer of
proprietors who are morally, politically and financially
dependent on the[m]."l' Compromise debates center on the
form of redress (in-kind, voucher, or cash), the cut-off dates for
the first redressable nationalizations, and persons eligible and
obliged.
2.3.1. The Czech And Slovak Republics
In the former CSFR, and especially in the Czech lands, the
left lacked credibility due to its real or popularly perceived
association with the deposed Communist Party. 9  The
extreme anti-Communism of recent Czech politics is
unmatched in East-Central Europe. 0 This popular sentiment
" Vratislav Pechota, Privatization and Foreign Investment in
Czechoslovakia: The Legal Dimension, 24 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 305, 308
(1991).
1 See Goralczyk Interview, supra note 6. For information on investor
concern with reprivatization see, e.g., Hungary: Policy, Finance East
Europe, May 9, 1991, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File;
Russell Johnson, Hungary: New Investment Frontier, Bus. AM., Oct. 7,
1991, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File; Tyler Marshall, In
the Old Bloc, Who Owns What?, L.A. TIMES, at Al; Rediscovering the Wheel,
ECONOMIST, Apr. 14, 1990, at 19.
,' See Hungarian Property Rights Debate, supra note 6; Papers Warn
Against Too Extensive Return of Property, CTK Nat'l News Wire, Feb. 12,
1991, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File.
" See Tony R. Judt, Metamorphosis: The Democratic Revolution in
Czechoslovakia in EASTERN EUROPE IN REVOLUTION 107 (Ivo Banac ed.,
1992); Peter S. Green, Czechoslovak Restitution Could Cost $11 billion, UPI,
Feb. 21, 1991, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File
(interviewing Interior Minister Jan Langos); see also infra note 23; Urban
Interview, supra note 6.
"0 See Ivo Banac, Introduction in EASTERN EUROPE IN REVOLUTION, 1, 7-9
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is, in part, a reaction to the repressions that came in the wake
of the Soviet invasion of 1968; this brought in one of the
Eastern Bloc's more conservative governments, which for over
two decades suppressed economic and political initiative.2 1
The 1989 "transition" amounted to a quick and total
capitulation of the Communist party.2 Since the party
surrendered in 1989, Communists and anyone suspected of
Communist affiliation have been censured under all
pretexts.23
For these reasons, in the Czech region, state property
became the symbolic focus of hostility toward all the evils of
the past forty years. Former Czech Premier Petr Pithart
reflected in an interview that under the former regime the so-
called socialist ownership had been elevated to something
almost sacred.24 Therefore, socialist ownership was a fitting
centerpiece for an iconoclastic campaign of inverting the high
symbols of the past. Fueling this campaign was the fact that,
since 1945, the Czech lands had undergone the largest-scale
(Ivo Banac ed., 1992); see also Judt, supra note 19, at 108-10.
2 See Judt, supra note 19, at 96; Jon Elster, Constitutionalism in
Eastern Europe: An Introduction, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 447, 448-49 (1991);
Pechota, supra note 16, at 308.
22 See TIMoTHY GARTON ASH, WE THE PEOPLE: THE REVOLUTION OF '89
WITNESSED IN WARSAW, BUDAPEST, BERLIN AND PRAGUE 78-130 (1990).
23 See, e.g., Battle Lines Are Drawn: Former Editor of Rude Pravo
Arrested, PRAGUE POST, Mar. 24-30, 1992, at 1, on recent arrests and public
censure campaigns; Bill Hangley, Jr., Tempest Over Lustrace: Court Will
Review Screening Law, PRAGUE POST, Mar. 17-23, 1992, at 1. The
"Lustrace" campaign (opening secret police files to expose alleged
collaborators) has drawn protests from the ILO, the Council of Europe, and
a score of Human Rights organizations including Helsinki Watch. Id.;
Katherine A. Miller, Labor Leaders to Reject Screening Bill, PRAGUE POST,
Nov. 19-25, 1991, at 3.
Probably the most intense and comprehensive in the region, the Czech
anti-Communist effort is certainly not atypical. Similar campaigns have
occurred with varying intensity throughout East-Central Europe. For
example, the Hungarian Parliament recently attempted to extend the
statute of limitations for political crimes of the communist era. However,
the decision was invalidated by the Constitutional Court. See Zetenyi Calls
for Sovereignty of National Assembly over Constitutional Court, BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts, Mar. 12, 1992, available in LEXIS, World
Library, ALLWLD File.
24 Czech Premier Interviewed on Natural Restitzdtion and Financial
Compensation, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Jan. 25, 1991, available




nationalization in the region. 5 Unlike Slovakia, the Czech
republic gained little by heavy industrial development at the
expense of its small business sector; unlike Hungary,
Czechoslovakia permitted no mixed ownership forms; and
unlike Poland, Czechoslovakia was thoroughly collectivized.
Most of the distributive arguments traditionally made by
the left were voiced in the CSFR by Parliament Members from
Slovakia, and by Slovakia's republican officials. Vladimir
Meciar, the undisputed leader of Slovakia's drive to
independence and its current Premier, led the parliamentary
fight against restitution.26 Primarily an agricultural, poor
and stratified society prior to 1948, especially in comparison to
its Czech neighbor, Slovakia had few regrets about earlier
nationalizations of its maldistributed wealth, but it had many
fears about losing the subsidies and eastern markets for its
industry developed under the Communist government.2 The
fact that Slovakia has continued implementing major aspects
of the federal program is somewhat surprising against the
background of Meciar's popularity and vocal opposition to
restitution. The later suggests that Slovakia may not have
passed such a comprehensive restitution program had it been
left to its own devices from the beginning.
Technocrat arguments had less force in the CSFR than
elsewhere in the region. One week before the Large Federal
Restitution Law passed, twenty-seven of the CSFR's leading
economists, including government ministers, released the
following statement against the bill:
Arguments that an extensive restitution of property in
kind is the fastest form of privatization is [sic] a
fiction.... Instead of speeding up privatization, it
would actually slow it down and prolong it perhaps for
"' See George White, Trading Stalinism for Capitalism: Czecho-
slovakia.. ., L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 3, 1991, at D1, D10.
" For the Slovak position onreprivatization, see, e.g., Slovak Government
Does Not Agree With Restitution, CTK National News Wire, Feb. 19, 1991,
available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File; Slovak Premier Says
Restitution In Kind Would Be Major Mistake, BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, Feb. 21, 1991, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD
File. But see Judt, supra note 19 (discussing Slovak support for Church
restitution).
27 Judt, supra note 19; Slovak Government Does Not Agree With
Restitution, supra note 26.
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decades.... A very serious consequence of this
situation would be the limitation and perhaps even
halting of the influx of foreign capital which is so
necessary in the restoration of the Czechoslovak
economy.
28
These and similar arguments failed, in part, because in 1990
the CSFR found itself in a very different economic situation
from that of Hungary and Poland. First, the country's foreign
debt was very low by the region's standards. 9 Second, its
privatization campaign was a late-starter, trailing Hungary's
by at least three years, and Poland's by two. 0 Even the
politicians normally attentive to technocrat arguments on the
economy and foreign investment, such as then-Finance
Minister Vaclav Klaus (now Premier of the Czech Republic),
gave primacy to moral purification over foreign investment in
the restitution debates.3 '
The order of enactment of the four restitution laws in the
CSFR reflects the relative symbolic weights which the new
political forces assigned the nationalizations. The first law
passed, the Small Federal Restitution Law, was by far the
most popular and least controversial of the federal laws, for
28 Group of Economists Express Concern Over Restitution Bill, BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts, Feb. 15. 1991, available in LEXIS, World
Library, ALLWLD File.
" See Ernest Beck, Dollars Flow into a Scarred Society, THE TIMES
(LONDON), Nov. 21, 1991, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File;
Regional Survey, IBC Int'l Country Risk Guide, Oct., 1990, available in
LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File.
30 See Gail E. Schares, The Lessons Russia Can Learn From Eastern
Europe, BUS. WK., Jan. 20, 1992, at 45. For a discussion of the legal aspects
of Czechoslovak privatization, see Pechota, supra note 16.
31 See Green, supra note 19; see also Prague Votes to Return Nationalized
Property, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 22, 1991, § 1 at 1, 20; Pechota, supra note 16, at
308.
Politicians in the CSFR are used to the criticisms of their "impractical"
restitution programs; a standard response to "pragmatic questioning" on the
subject addresses the idealism and a certain moral superiority of the new
Czech and Slovak politics over their counterparts in Hungary and Poland.
See e.g., comments by Deputy Prime Minister Pavel Rychetsky to The N.Y.
Times: "'[T]here is greater moral awareness here' about the appropriateness
of returning property." Czechs to Return Seized Property, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
27, 1991, at A10; see also Interview with Jiri Dienstbier, Jr., MP, Civic
Movement Party, in Prague, Czech Republic (Mar. 23, 1992) [hereinafter





three reasons. First, the nationalizations this law redressed
were the most brutal and least popular of the post-war years
as they coincided with massive purges and repressions.2
Second, the first law returned small property of greater
personal significance to a larger number of people than did the
subsequent laws. Finally, the usual reprivatization opponents
did not object strenuously to this law as the technocrats
reasoned that small-scale restitution would affect few
companies marketed to foreigners, and the left was assuaged
by its negligible distributive impact."3 By contrast, the
Federal Land Law, passed third, met a greater range of
opposition than its two predecessors. In addition to the usual
suspects among technocrats and left-wingers, the Agricultural
Party, which represents farming cooperatives trying to retain
control of their land in the wake of 1989, vocally opposed the
Federal Land Law. Appealing to technocrats and the left
alike, the Agricultural Party argued that the cooperatives had
been a relatively successful part of the country's economy. 4
The fourth law passed, the Czech Restitution Law,
returned land confiscated from ethnic Germans and
Hungarians, and was largely removed from economic
considerations, and thus from the concerns of the left and the
technocrats. The intensity and breadth of opposition to the
Czech Restitution Law is evidence of popular belief in the
3 2 See JUDY BATr, ECONOMIC REFORM AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN
EASTERN EUROPE: A COMPARISON OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK AND HUNGARIAN
EXPERIENCES 68-72 (1988); see also JERZY TOMASzEWSKI, THE SOCIALIST
REGIMES OF EAST CENTRAL EUROPE: THEIR ESTABLISHMENT AND
CONSOLIDATION 1944-67, (Jolanta Krauze trans.) 245, 253-56; Sokol
Interview, supra note 6.
" Personal communication with Dr. Alexander J. Belohlavek, Attorney,
Spokesman for the Agricultural Party, in Prague, Czech Republic (Aug. 12,
1991) [hereinafter Belohlavek Interview]; Dienstbier Interview, supra note
31; Sokol Interview, supra note 6; Urban Interview, supra note 6; see also
Privatization of Czechoslovak Industry, Bus. L. Brief, Nov., 1990, available
in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File (calling the reversed
nationalizations of 1955-59 economically "unimportant").
" See, Belohlavek Interview, supra note 33; New Economic Laws in
Czechoslovakia, East European Markets, Jan. 10, 1992, available in LEXIS,
World Library, ALLWLD File.
The passage of the Federal Land Law did not settle the controversy
surrounding the cooperatives. Instead, the law left a precarious compromise
by which agricultural land owners and cooperatives would form councils to
oversee the transition. See New Economic Laws in Czechoslovakia, supra.
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justice of these post-war expropriations, and the persistent
assumption of the collective guilt of Germans and Hungarians.
These factors, as well as the growing general awareness of the
costs of restitution, came close to tipping the symbolic balance
against the Czech Restitution Law.
35
2.3.2. Hungary
Hungary's limited compensation program reflects an
atypical influence of the technocrats in its post-socialist
politics, particularly among the liberal opposition in the
parliament which passed the compensation laws. 6 The first
post-Communist government in Hungary was ideologically
center-right nationalist, similar to those governments which
won 1990 elections elsewhere in East-Central Europe.37 Yet,
" See e.g., Most Czechs Oppose Sudeten German Restitution, CTK
National News Wire, July 26, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library,
ALLWLD File ("[A] survey.., indicated that a great majority of Czechs do
not doubt that the deportations [of ethnic Germans after World War II on
the principle of collective war crimes guilt] were rightful."); see also Czech
Premier Interviewed on Natural Restitution and Financial Compensation,
supra note 24; Dubi Mayor Expresses Concern over Sudeten German
Demands, CTK National Newswire, Dec. 22, 1992, available in LEXIS,
World Librar ALLWLD File; Feature photograph of a Prague
demonstration against restitution for Sudeten Germans, PRAGUE POST, Mar.
17-23, 1992, at 1; Government and Parliamentary Affairs in Brief. Czech
National Council Discusses Bill on Property Restitution, BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts, Apr. 20, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library,
ALLWLD File; Prague Rejects German Property Claims, Reuter Library
Report, July 13, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File
(containing comments by Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus); Today's
Press Survey, CTK National Newswire, Apr. 17, 1992, available in LEXIS,
World Library, ALLWLD File. But see Czech Defense Council Discusses
Implementation of Law on Civilian Service, BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, Nov. 9, 1990, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File
(reporting that Civic Forum asserts that the refusal of German claims is
dictated by pragmatic concerns, not by continuing application of the
collective guilt principle); Francis Harris & Robin Gedye, Czech Fear of
German Economic Offensive, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Feb. 5, 1992, Int'l Sec., at
9; Today's Press Survey, CTK National Newswire, Apr. 18, 1992, available
in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File.
S See Banac, supra note 20, at 7-9. The opposition has lost support since
the first election. At least one opposition MP recently suggested that in
today's political climate, a CSFR-style restitution law would have more
support in Hungary than it had immediately after the transition of 1989.
Interview with Dr. Matyas Eorsi, MP, Free Democrats, in Budapest,
Hungary (Mar. 26, 1992) [hereinafter Eorsi Interview].




a key member of the governing coalition which had restitution
as the centerpiece of its platform, the Independent
Smallholders' Party, made an unexpectedly poor showing at
the polls."8
However, the socialist left was also weak in Hungary,
notwithstanding full-scale political participation of the
Hungarian Communist Party in the 1989 transition and
projections of its strength in the emerging political scene.
Hungary saw a negotiated electoral transition from state
socialism, which helped avoid a Czech-style "decommunization"
fever, and allowed Hungary's liberal opposition to voice
distributive arguments without losing credibility."9  The
relative moderation of Hungary's anti-Communism was due
partly to over two decades of reform effort leading up to 1989.
During that period, the Communist leadership of Hungary
encouraged creativity and innovation in the economic sphere,
introducing, among other elements, mixed forms of ownership
in agriculture and industry. Such innovations, coupled with
the country's relative prosperity and mild political climate,
created considerable loyalty to the old ownership regime
(though not necessarily the government itself) among the
population. 0
Technocratic arguments were the predominant force
" The Independent Smallholders, organized in September 1988,
purported to inherit the mantle of a party of the same name which had
dominated the last pre-Communist parliament in Hungary. See BATT, supra
note 32, at 54; Bruszt & Stark, supra note 5, n. 28 at 31. Although the
liberal technocrats have lost ground since 1990, the Smallholders, who have
since split into two factions over the restitution-compensation issue, did not
gain by the weakening of the opposition.
" Bruszt & Stark, supra note 5, at 51, 40-55; see also Elster, supra note
21, at 455-58.
The position of the Hungarian left on reprivatization is not clear cut.
In a stunning statement made at the height the of upheavals in 1989,
Hungary's last Communist Premier, Miklos Nemeth, suggested that his
government may have been willing to go along with considerable
denationalization of the economy: "We start out along a political line whose
basis is that between 1945 and 1950 we over-nationalized, we try to correct
this over-nationalization, that is, we want to launch a re-privatization
programme within the framework of a programme for stimulating
enterprise..." Premier Nemeth's Reply Budget Debate, BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts, June 6, 1989, available in LEXIS, World Library,
ALLWLD File.
4 See, e.g., Brust & Stark, supra note 5 (discussing peasant opposition
to reform).
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against restitution in Hungary. Technocrats argued, for
example, that "partial return of farmland will trigger a rash of
competing claims that will paralyze the courts for years and
harm the investment environment." They prevailed despite
the Smallholders' threats to leave the governing coalition
(thereby breaking its majority), and symbolic land seizures
which the Smallholders organized in the countryside.42
The technocrat position in Hungary was powerful for two
reasons. At the time of the debates, the country's foreign debt
was the highest per capita in the region. In addition, its
privatization campaign had started some years before 1989,
and was escalating at the time reprivatization legislation
entered Parliament. 43 As a result, in 1990, Hungary's new
leaders could safely tell their disgruntled constituents that
"the extent of compensation can be only as great as the
country's load-bearing capacity permits. ' Although the
parliamentary opposition has weakened, popular awareness of
Hungary's economic problems remains strong. In the spring
of 1992, the Second Compensation Law listed "both society's
conception of justice and its ability to sustain burdens" among
the motivating factors in its preamble.45
41 See Peter Maass, Hungary to Give Land, Credit to the Dispossessed,
WASH. POST, Apr. 25, 1991, at A22.
41 See Donald Forbes, Impatient Hungarian Farmers Seize Back
Confiscated Land, The Reuter Library Report, Feb. 11, 1991, available in
LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File.
' See Beck, supra note 29; Regional Survey, supra note 29. On earlier
reform efforts, see Law VI.1987, On Limited Liability Companies (effective
1987, amended 1990).
" Speech by Imre Konya, parliamentary faction leader for the dominant
Hungarian Democratic Forum ("CMDF") and key figure in the roundtable
transition talks of 1989, Political Parties in Brief, BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, Feb. 20, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD
File; see also Zsuzsa Ban, Decisions, Decisions, HUNGARIAN OBSERVER, Sept.,
1991, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File; Ministry of Finance
Figures on Financial Implications of Compensation, MTI Econews, June 27,
1991, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File; Privatization,
FINANCE EAST EUROPE, Apr. 24, 1991, available in LEXIS, World Library,
ALLWLD File; Parliament: Compensation-Party Opinions, MTI Econews,
Feb. 5, 1991, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File.






Poland's failure to pass a reprivatization bill may be
explained in part by the atypical strength of its trade unions
which advance traditionally leftist distributive justice
arguments against restitution. Furthermore, early and
widespread awareness of the country's economic difficulties
added support to technocratic objections to reprivatization.
The "Transition of 1989" took ten years in Poland and was
spearheaded by the working-class Solidarity movement.4
Unlike its Czechoslovak counterpart, the Polish Communist
Party played an active role in the Round Table talks which
guided the transition from state socialism.4" Working class
influence is still very strong in Polish politics, although it is
progressively taking a back seat to new middle class
privatization concerns.4 Warnings against the "restoration
of an inequitable pre-war social order" have been articulated
by ordinary citizens and politicians in Poland more often than
anywhere else in East-Central Europe.4
In this respect, it is worth noting that even the most
radical champions of restitution in Poland exempt the
Communist land reform of 1944 from their proposals." Most
Polish farmers first received land in 1944, with over eighty
percent of their number retaining private plots under the
Communist governments. 1  The existence of a large
agricultural population, fearful of losing its land, may explain
"' See GARTON ASH, supra note 22, at 25-46, 78; see also TIMOTHY
GARTON ASH, THE POLISH REVOLUTION, SOLIDARITY 1980-82 (1983)
[hereinafter GARTON ASH, SOLIDARITY]; Leszek Kolakowski, Amidst Moving
Ruins, DAEDALUS, Spring 1991 at 50-51.
47 See Bruszt & Stark, supra note 5, at 17-18; Elster, supra note 21, at
455-56.
"4 See Robert Bogdanski, Poland Between Elections: First Catch Your
Voter, 4 EAST EUROPEAN REPORTS 92, 94 (1991); Czynczyk Interview, supra
note 12; see also Tomasz Zukowski, Return of Big Owners Unwelcomed by
Poles, Polish News Bulletin, Dec. 18, 1992, available in LEXIS, World
Library, ALLWLD File (reporting an account of a recent opinion poll on
reprivatization, containing a socio-economic breakdown of the respondents).
"' Mary Battiata, Issue of Seized Property Divides Poles: Ex-Owners'
Prospects Founder in Financial Straits of the New Rule, WASH. POST, May
5, 1991, at A35.
s See Returned to Owner, supra note 13.
"See generally Reprivatization Barriers, Polish News Bulletin, Mar. 8,
1991, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File.
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the wavering reprivatization momentum in Poland.
As they heed arguments of efficiency or distributive justice,
Polish politicians often highlight the difference between their
country and the Czech Republic, citing the Czech restitution
program as an example that they wish to avoid. Commenting
on what lessons the CSFR's restitution might hold for his
country, Poland's then-Finance Minister Leszek Balcerowicz
said bluntly, "[i]t's time to learn from someone else's mistakes,
not our own."5" President Walesa once characterized
Czechoslovakia's "decommunization" impulse as an emotional
reaction to the "helplessness" of their economic reform laws.5"
Although this statement would paint Walesa a moderate by
Czech standards, the President, by no means a leftist, has
been the driving force of Poland's reprivatization effort. Since
early 1991, Walesa has advocated the most extreme forms of
all-out restitution, while his own government .has favored
partial compensation.54 It is telling that Walesa appointed
the chairman of the Polish Industrialists' Association, a
prominent domestic restitution lobby, as his "special official for
reprivatization."55
Also lobbying for restitution is the Polish Union of Real
Estate Owners, an influential organization of former owners
and their heirs that is some 60,000 strong.5" Additional
advocates include the Christian Nationalists, known as the
"Polish Action" movement in the Parliament, and the monarchists.!
62 Battiata, supra note 49.
3 President Walesa Interviewed on Current Unrest and Support for
Government, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Jan. 14, 1992, available
in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File.
s" See Patricia Clough, The Power Becomes Him; Lech Walesa Seems
Quite Pleased to be the President of Poland, But Does the Electrician Have
the Tools to Get His Country's Economy Running, INDEPENDENT, Apr. 22,
1991, at 19; Walesa's 100 Days; Things Great and Small, WARSAW VOICE,
Apr. 14, 1991, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File
[hereinafter Walesa's 100 Days].
At the height of his restitution campaign, Walesa promised emigre Poles
in the U.S. that they would recover lost real estate in kind if they moved to
Poland. Patricia Clough, Walesa Backs Return of Seized Land,
INDEPENDENT, Apr. 9, 1991, at 10.
" See Walesa's 100 Days, supra note 54.
5 6Poland Draws Up Plans to Return Seized Property, supra note 13.
5 Jadwiga Stachura, Polish Monarchists: The Movement for the Throne,
WARSAW VOICE, May 23, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD




In an effort to win over the technocrats, Walesa and his
allies have tried to link reprivatization to efforts at injecting
momentum into Polish privatization, which has suffered from
a lack of foreign investment. To allay fears of inequitable
distribution, the government's recent reprivatization proposals
have reflected a "more populist approach" of its economic
policy to "put more of the nation's wealth in private Polish
hands." 8 However, even the President has acknowledged
that contrary to such efforts, reprivatization passions are
running out of steam.5" Despite sporadic bursts of activity in
the Parliament, polls suggest that the majority of the
population is not keen on restitution, and is at best lukewarm
in its support for limited compensation.6 °
An explanation of the popularity of technocrat arguments
in Poland may lie in the same factors which determined the
outcome of reprivatization in Hungary and Czechoslovakia:
foreign debt, inflation, and the state of the privatization
program, along with popular awareness of the country's
economic predicament. Poland's foreign debt has been very
high; its inflation rate has been among the highest in the
region, and its privatization program, although not as
advanced as Hungary's, was ahead of the former CSFR. 1
Polish News Agency, May 26, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library,
ALLWLD File.
"s Philippa Fletcher, Poland Adopts Populist Approach to Privatization,
Reuters, Feb. 11, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File
(emphasis added); see also Government Debates Privatization, Adopts Four
Draft Laws, PAP News Wire, Mar. 10, 1992, available in LEXIS, World
Library, ALLWLD File; Government's Socio-Economic Guidelines: Pros and
Cons, Polish News Bulletin, Mar. 6, 1992, available in LEXIS, World
Library, ALLWLD File; President Attends Peasant Agreement Caucus
Meeting, PAP News Agency, Mar. 6, 1992, available in LEXIS, World
Library, ALLWLD File; President Walesa at Government Presidium Meeting
Supports Special Powers, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Feb. 18, 1992,
available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File.
"' See Government Debates Privatization, Adopts FourDraft Laws, supra
note 58; Government's Socio-Economic Guidelines: Pros and Cons, supra
note 58; President Walesa at Government Presidium Meeting Supports
Special Powers, supra note 58.
" See, e.g., Cydejko, supra note 6; Pawlak Addresses Sejm, supra note
14 (reporting that a moderate compensation law stands a greater chance of
generating public acceptance than a law providing for presumptive
restitution).
"x See Kevin R. Boyd, Strong Export Growth Results in U.S. Surplus with
Changing Europe: European Transformation Creates Wealth of New
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Furthermore, Poland's population, the subject of Eastern
Europe's first experiment with "shock therapy," was keenly
aware of the belt-tightening implications of creating new
obligations on the government. 2 These factors give credence
to the technocrat arguments against restitution.
Significantly, much of the success of the Suchocka
Government Bill was due to the argument that a
reprivatization law offering restitution and voucher
compensation would cost the government nearly fifty times
less in pay-outs and administrative costs than would the
already proliferating claims under Articles 156, 158 and 160
of the Polish Code of Administrative Procedure."3 Claims
against different government authorities under the
administrative code are subject to no compensation ceiling, no
citizenship, residence or legal status limitations with regard to
eligible claimants, and, in the absence of a central
administering authority, create an enormous burden on courts
and administrators.64
Moreover, where such a default mechanism is used,
regardless of its cost, no politician can take credit for
redressing injustice by legislative means. Accordingly, if
politicians can paint a reprivatization bill as a populist
measure, they stand to reap tangible electoral benefits if it
passes.65
Opportunities, World Trade Outlook, Apr. 22, 1991, available in LEXIS,
World Library, ALLWLD File.
" USA: Sachs Appeal-Simple Economic Solutions, Reuter Textline,
Feb. 13, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File.
6" See Privatization Aims in '93: Going by the Book, WARSAW VOICE, Jan.
31, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File; see also
Returned to Owner, supra note 13. The government's figures are ZI 500
billion (about $25.2 million) with a reprivatization law, as opposed to ZI 250
trillion without; the latter figure amounting to half of the government's 1993
budget. See Poland Outlines Reprivatization Plans, supra note 13; Turek,
supra note 13.
64 See Reprivatisation Barriers, supra note 51.
65 See Janina Paradowska & Wieslaw Wladyka, Polish Populism, Model





2.4. Results Of Reprivatization Initiatives
Although the nationalist right was strong throughout the
region following the events of 1989, the fate of reprivatization
proposals appears ultimately to have been a function of the
relative strengths of the left and the technocrats in each
country. Thus, Czechoslovakia was able to pass radical
restitution laws with relatively little opposition, in part
because its left-wing politicians lacked credibility following the
rapid, total and undignified capitulation of the Communist
Party in the fall of 1989. In the absence of hyperinflation and
high foreign debt, and given the late-starting privatization
program, awareness of the country's economic problems did not
begin to spread through the population until after the crucial
laws had been passed. This fact detracted from the efficiency
arguments advanced by the technocrats.
By contrast, Hungary's high foreign debt, largely
accumulated in an effort to reform its socialist economy during
the mid-1980s, as well as its advanced privatization program,
helped give credence to the technocrat arguments.
Furthermore, distributive justice arguments against
restitution were not automatically dismissed as "communist"
in Hungary, in part as a result of the country's complex,
negotiated transition from state socialism. These factors help
explain Hungary's moderate compensation program.
The unique role of worker-dominated Solidarity in Poland's
transition from state socialism helped advance distributive
justice arguments against restitution in that country. Poland's
high inflation rate, high foreign debt, and early experiments
with economic reform helped boost the popularity of efficiency
arguments advanced by the technocrats. This unique
combination of a viable left and technocrat influence helps
account for the absence of a reprivatization law in Poland, and
may also help explain the unconventional political strategies
adopted by advocates of reprivatization in that country.
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3. COMPARISON OF REPRIVATIZATION LAws
ENACTED IN THE CZECH AND SLOVAK
REPUBLICS, HUNGARY AND POLAND
3.1. Introduction
This section offers an overview of the laws passed in the
Czech, Slovak and Hungarian Republics, and of the recent
Polish bills."6 The principal categories for comparison are
grounds for redress, remedies, subjects of reprivatization and
claims procedures and institutions. The discussion will
highlight the differences in legal mechanisms, and the vastly
different scales on which reprivatization programs hope to
effect redress. The similarities among the programs will be
addressed primarily in the summary conclusion to this section.
3.2. The Czech And Slovak Republics
3.2.1. Grounds For Redress
Two of the three major restitution laws of the former
CSFR, the Large Federal Restitution Law and the Federal
Land Law, presumptively enable most claims to be filed based
on nationalizations effected after the February 25, 1948 cut-off
date (the first session of the Communist parliament).' The
Small Federal Restitution Law applies to specific small-scale
nationalizations of the late 1950s.6 " The Large Federal
Restitution Law and the Federal Land Law apply to most
property not covered by the Small Federal Restitution Law."
" The discussion of the Polish bills is necessarily more vague than the
preceding analysis of the laws passed in the other countries, as it is based
primarily on press reports. At times, several reprivatization bills have
entered the Polish parliament simultaneously or in quick succession, usually
within weeks. Thus it is not possible to guarantee that the bills discussed
here comprise the entire universe of the latest proposals. The discussion of
the bills is intended primarily to give the reader an idea of the range of
legal options considered in Poland since 1989, and some indication of their
relative political viability.
' Large Federal Restitution Law, supra note 8, art. 1; Federal Land
Law, supra note 8, § 4(1).
68 Small Federal Restitution Law, supra note 7, arts. 1, 25.
o Small Federal Restitution Law, supra note 7, arts. 1, 25; Large
Federal Restitution Law, supra note 8, art. 1(1); Federal Land Law, supra




Although the Large Federal Restitution Law and the
Federal Land Law contain lists of repealed nationalization
regulations, 0 they also contain catch-all provisions, which
enable claims to be filed for property taken in violation or
outside the scope of then-valid laws, inadequately compensated
takings, and all other state deprivations of natural persons'
property rights."1  The more recent Czech Republic
Restitution Law is perceived as a rather unpopular exception
to the rigid cut-off date of February 25, 1948. This law returns
property to ethnic Germans and Hungarians collectively
expropriated as Nazi collaborators by the 1945 decrees of
Czechoslovakia's non-Communist President Edvard Benes.7"
Technically, however, this latest restitution law does not
alter the legality of the Benes decrees. Rather, the law grants
relief from several early measures of the Communist
government, which, while they restored citizenship to the
expropriated Germans and Hungarians remaining in
Czechoslovakia, failed to return their property.
78
3.2.2. Remedies
The three federal laws and the Czech Restitution Law
provide for presumptive restitution, and for compensation in
cash and securities where restitution is impossible. 4 The
owner may elect for cash compensation when the property was
7, Large Federal Restitution Law, supra note 8, arts. 6; Federal Land
Law, supra note 8, § 6.
71 See Large Federal Restitution Law, supra note 8, art. 6(2); Federal
Land Law, supra note 8, § 6(1). The catch-all provisions in effect make
presumptively illegal all property holding by state entities.
7 See Czech Restitution Law, supra note 10.
71 See Czech Premier Interviewed on Journalists' Screening, Restitution
ofProperty, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Apr. 24, 1992, available in
LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File.
74 Large Federal Restitution Law, supra note 8, art. 13(1); Federal Land
Law, supra note 8, §§ 14(1), 16(1); see also Pechota, supra note 16, at 307-
08.
Although the Large Federal Restitution Law addresses non-property
infringements such as political persecution, the relief it grants is largely
declaratory. The law invalidates a wide range of expulsions, job
terminations, imprisonments and lesser offenses and their consequences.
Large Federal Restitution Law, supra note 8, arts. 14-30. The law does not
entitle successful claimants to job reinstatement, damages, or special
pensions. Id., art. 22(6).
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substantially altered or destroyed, or where partial
compensation was received.7 5 Compensation is the only form
of redress where current holders of the property are exempt
from claims under the laws (e.g., natural persons, companies
with foreign participation, foreign states), or where the
property serves exempted public purposes (e.g., public health
and recreation, natural reserves, national heritage)."'
Cash compensation under the Large Federal Restitution
Law may not exceed Kcs 30,000 (about $1,000);" the balance
must be paid in state securities which may not be bonds.'
Only former owners are entitled to cash compensation under
that law and under the Federal Land Law; their heirs receive
the entire amount of compensation in state securities.""
Where all non-real estate property of a natural person had
been confiscated under one or more of the regulations
invalidated by the Small or Large Federal Restitution Laws,
the latter law provides for lump sum compensation of Kcs
60,000 (about $2,000), subject to the general cash payment
limitation.8"
The value of real estate for compensation is set in
accordance with valuation rules in force on the date the
applicable restitution law enters into effect."1 Restitution of
Small Federal Restitution Law, supra note 7, arts. 14-19; Large
Federal Restitution Law, supra note 8, art. 13; Federal Land Law, supra
note 8, § 16.
See Large Federal Restitution Law, supra note 8, arts. 7, 8.
" It is unclear from art. 13(5) of the law whether the ceiling applies to
claims on one piece of property by any number of persons, by one person on
any number of pieces of property, or to both.
" Large Federal Restitution Law, supra note 8, arts. 11, 13(4)-(6);
Federal Land Law, supra note 8, §§ 6(7), 16(1).
"' Large Federal Restitution Law, supra note 8, art. 13(6); Federal Land
Law, supra note 8, § 16(1).
' Large Federal Restitution Law, supra note 8, art. 13(2).
8 Large Federal Restitution Law, supra note 8, arts. 7(4), 13(5). It is
unclear from the wording of the Large Federal Restitution Law whether
such rules are to be used to determine the market value of the property at
confiscation (as distinct from the often fictitious value then assigned by the
state), or the value at the time of the law's entry into effect. This is
significant, among other reasons, because under Article 7(4) of the law, the
former owner must reimburse the person handing over the property for the
difference between the "original" and "increased" value of the property. If
"original" means at the time of confiscation, then the state, or possibly the




land was initially limited to parcels under 150 hectares for
non-agricultural land and 250 hectares for farmland. 2 The
Federal Assembly removed the limit in February of 1992.83
Compensation for agricultural land is granted only in cases
where neither the land originally confiscated, nor a
substantially similar parcel in the locality is available as a
substitute award." Under the Federal Land Law, the state
may also be liable for the compensation or replacement of dead
livestock and abandoned crops. 5
Under the federal laws, a successful claimant receives the
property free and clear of obligations incurred after
nationalization." However, any leases on the property may
not be terminated for ten years following restitution, except
where the term expires earlier. Leases may, however, be
renegotiated under current market conditions.8 " Pending
whereas if it means "at the time the law enters into effect," the former
owner is the beneficiary, save for a case of a substantial increase between
the time the law enters into effect and the time a restitution claim is lodged.
Other provisions of the Large Federal Restitution Law, such as those
providing for replacement of value lost since confiscation (art. 7(3)), suggest
that the compensation value is calculated as of the time of confiscation, and
measured in accordance with valuation rules in effect at the time of the
restitution law. See Large Federal Restitution Law, supra note 8, art. 7(3).
Furthermore, the Small Federal Restitution Law, supra note 7, art. 14(1),
specifically provides that the value to be compensated is as of the
confiscation date (in that case, as determined by Ministry of Finance
Announcement 73/1964 Sb. (still in effect)), plus three percent of that value
for every year between the confiscation and the entry of the restitution law
into effect.
* Federal Land Law, supra note 8, § 6(3).
"See FederalAssembly Rejects ConstitutionalAmendments on Executive
Powers, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Feb. 20, 1992, available in
LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File.
" Federal Land Law, supra note 8, § 11(2)-(3); see also id., art. 12 (This
provides substitute awards for successful claimants from among several
entitled to the same parcel of land which had been nationalized several
times. In this case, the first person to lose the property gets it back;
subsequent owners/losers get substitute property or compensation.).
"' Federal Land Law, supra note 8, §§ 15, 20.
36 The former owner must reimburse the state if the latter had met any
of the former owner's pre-nationalization obligations with respect to the
property. Large Federal Restitution Law, supra note 8, art. 10(2)-(3);
Federal Land Law, supra note 8, § 6(5).
"' Large Federal Restitution Law, supra note 8, art. 12. Unlike the
occupancy rights created by a term lease, use rights are not protected under
restitution legislation. A successful claim under a restitution law
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restitution, the holder of eligible property is liable for its
condition to the successful claimant under a strict standard of
care.
88
3.2.3. Subjects Of Reprivatization
Only natural persons may claim under all but the Small
Federal Restitution Law. 9 Companies may claim under the
Small Federal Restitution Law, provided they were
expropriated as such by one of the regulations which that law
redresses."0 However, all Czech and Slovak laws allow
proportional remedies to former co-owners, partners and
corporate shareholders who are natural persons.9 Where the
former owner is dead, testamentary heirs or immediate family
may claim in proportion to their share of the inheritance. 2
The Small Federal Restitution Law allows claims by
persons who are neither citizens nor residents of the Czech
and Slovak Republics.9" The remaining two federal laws and
the Czech Restitution Law require claimants to be citizens and
residents of the CSFR and the Czech Republic respectively.9
Despite many complaints, mostly from emigrants, courts in the
successor republics of Czechoslovakia are not likely to accept
automatically creates a tenancy relationship between the user and the
original owner, which may be terminated on short notice within several
months of the law's entry into effect, particularly where the original owner
chooses to engage in an agricultural enterprise. Federal Land Law, supra
note 8, § 22.
8 Large Federal Restitution Law, supra note 8, art. 9; Federal Land
Law, supra note 8, § 5(2).
8 Large Federal Restitution Law, supra note 8, art. 3(1); Federal Land
Law, supra note 8, § 4(1); Czech Restitution Law, supra note 10, art. 2(1).
" The Small Federal Restitution Law allows claims by "private legal
entities." Small Federal Restitution Law, supra note 7, art. 1.
" Small Federal Restitution Law, supra note 7, art. 3(3); Large Federal
Restitution Law, supra note 8, art. 5(5); Federal Land Law, supra note 8,
§ 21.
" Small Federal Restitution Law, supra note 7, art. 3; Large Federal
Restitution Law, supra note 8, art. 3; Federal Land Law, supra note 8, § 4;
Czech Restitution Law, supra note 10, art. 3.
"Small Federal Restitution Law, supra note 7, arts. 2, 6(4).
'4 Large Federal Restitution Law, supra note 8, art. 3(1)-(2); Federal
Land Law, supra note 8, §§ 3-4; Czech Restitution Law, supra note 10, art.




constitutional challenges to the exclusion of foreign claims.95
Under the Czech and Slovak restitution laws, the §tate is
the only "obliged person."" However, the allocation of
liabilities within the sprawling state and along its fuzzy
boundaries differs among the laws. For example, under the
Large Federal Restitution Law and the Federal Land Law, the
two republican governments are liable for paying cash
compensation and for issuing compensation securities. Such
liability includes returning any purchase price to non-state
entities that had to surrender property to former owners. 
7
These provisions are in contrast to similar provisions of the
Small Federal Restitution Law, which make the ministries in
charge of administering the claimed properties liable for
compensation.8
As a rule, the state must offer compensation where
property otherwise eligible for restitution is owned or used by
natural persons or foreign entities. Restitution is barred in
such cases.99 However, natural persons must return property
in kind if they acquired it illegally or as a result of personal
involvement in persecuting former owners."°  Courts may
also compel all foreign entities and natural persons who
acquired eligible property in the former CSFR after October 1,
1990 to return it or pay compensation. This provision, which
"See Interview with Dr. Petr Liska, Vice-Chairman of the Legal
Department, CSFR Federal Government, in Prague, Czech Republic, Mar.
24, 1992 [hereinafter Liska Interview]; Interview with Dr. Bohumil Repik,
Vice-President of the Supreme Court of the CSFR, in Prague, Czech
Republic, Mar. 25, 1992 [hereinafter Repik Interview]; Sokol Interview,
supra note 6. But see Jeffrey J. Renzulli, Comment, Claims of U.S.
Nationals Under the Restitution Laws of Czechoslovakia, 15 B.C. INTL &
COMP. L.R. 165 (arguing for inclusion of non-citizen, non-resident claims in
Czechoslovak restitution). Note that the Federal Land Law, which regulates
all agricultural real estate ownership in the CSFR, in addition to restitution
matters, bars all foreign ownership of land in the CSFR. Federal Land Law,
supra note 8, § 3.
Large Federal Restitution Law, supra note 8, art. 4.
' Large Federal Restitution Law, supra note 8, arts. 11, 13(4)-(6);
Federal Land Law, supra note 8, §§ 6(7), 16(1).
" Small Federal Restitution Law, supra note 7, arts. 7(b), 14(1), 15(1).
"Small Federal Restitution Law, supra note 7, art. 4; Large Federal
Restitution Law, supra note 8, arts. 4, 13; Federal Land Law, supra note 8,
§§ 5, 11, 14. Under Czech and Slovak law, use is an administrative category
distinct from term lease.
," Large Federal Restitution Law, supra note 8, art. 4(2).
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establishes the day before the first federal restitution law was
passed as the date of constructive notice of the restitution
program, targets fraudulent transfers to circumvent
restitution.1'0
3.2.4. Claims Procedures and Institutions
Unlike the Hungarian laws and most Polish initiatives, the
Czech and Slovak laws have designated no administrative
authority to review restitution claims. This is remarkable
since the CSFR's restitution program was the most radical of
the ones recently enacted.'0 2 All claims under the Czech and
Slovak laws are made in writing by the former owner or heir
to the person holding the property on the date of the claim
("the Obliged Person").0 3 There is no standard application
form for restitution or compensation. Where the claim
recipient does not turn over the property within the statutory
time limit, the claimant can sue for restitution in court. T3
The involvement of regional Land Offices in the
administration of claims to agricultural property presents a
partial exception to the civil-law arrangement. Under Article
9 of the Federal Land Law, a restitution claimant must lodge
an application with a Land Office simultaneously with making
101 Large Federal Restitution Law, supra note 8, art. 4(1)(A). The former
CSFR's reprivatization program suspended privatization until all restitution
claims against given property are settled or expire. The general public was
considered to have been on notice of this suspension as of October 1, 1990
(one day before the passage of the Small Federal Restitution Law). The
withdrawal of foreign and natural person exemption after that date was
intended to prevent state transfers of eligible property in violation of the
suspension. Liska Interview, supra note 95; Sokol Interview, supra note 6;.
102 See Pechota, supra note 16, at 308, n.5 and accompanying text. Note
that where restitution claims concern objects of immediate privatization, the
corresponding privatization authorities become involved in aspects of claim
administration.
10 Small Federal Restitution Law, supra note 7, art. 6; Federal Land
Law, supra note 8, § 9; Large Federal Restitution Law, supra note 8, art. 5.
One of the Polish bills defeated last fall provided for a similar concept of an
"obliged person." See New Restitution Proposals, supra note 14. Another
defeated bill provided for a National Reprivatization Fund, containing
property, stocks and government securities for reprivatization awards. See
Reprivatisation Debate, supra note 14.
14 Small Federal Restitution Law, supra note 7, art. 22(3); Large Federal





a restitution demand on the current occupant of the property.
A Land Office may veto, compel or amend a subsequent
agreement to return the property under its jurisdiction.
Adequate reasons for such action include environmental
protection concerns, protection of the rights of other property
owners in the area, or any other reason of public policy,
provided it is "necessary and essential."'O While such a
standard is rather vague, the actions of a Land Office may be
reviewed by a civil court at the request of either the claimant
or the current occupant."'
3.3. Hungary
3.3.1. Grounds For Redress
Hungary's First Compensation Law enables claims to be
filed for nationalizations effected after the first session of the
Communist Parliament on June 8, 1949, under acts, decrees
and administrative regulations enumerated in Supplement 2
to the law." The list in Supplement 2 includes most of the
regulations which sanctioned nationalizations during the state
socialist period.'0 8 The Second Compensation Law, passed
pursuant to §§ 1(1) and 1(3) of the First Compensation Law,
incorporates the latter's mechanism for compensating victims
of expropriations. The laws and regulations which sanctioned
deprivations creating a compensation claim under the Second
Compensation Law are listed in Supplement 1 to the First
Compensation Law and Supplement 2 to the Second
Compensation Law. They were passed primarily between May
1939 (enactment of the first overtly anti-Semitic law of
Hungary's wartime government, Act IV/1939 "On Restricting
the Public and Economic Expansion of Jews") and the first
Communist Parliament in 1949.109
ISS Federal Land Law, supra note 8, § 9(5).
, Federal Land Law, supra note 8, § 9.
, First Compensation Law, supra note 8, § 1(2).
,S See Compensation Law Passed, MTI Econews, June 26, 1991,
available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File.
'" Second Compensation Law, supra note 9, §§ 1.2, 3, and supp. 2; see
First Compensation Law, supra note 8, § 1(1), (3). Post-1949 expropriation
regulations creating a compensation claim under the Second Compensation
Law are listed in supplement 2 to that law. Second Compensation Law,
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3.3.2. Remedies
Partial capital voucher compensation is the only form of
reprivatization in Hungary. Eligible claimants receive
vouchers known as Compensation Coupons whose face value
is roughly proportional to the established value of the lost
property."' Supplement 3 to the First Compensation Law sets
forth most of the valuation guidelines. For non-agricultural
real estate, compensation is measured in proportion to the
area, valued at HUF 200 to HUF 2000 per square meter,
depending on the present location. Classifications include
Budapest, provincial towns, villages and vacant lots outside
any of the enumerated areas. For companies, the value is
proportional to the size of the workforce permanently
employed at the time of confiscation.' Where the claim is
for loss of farmland, cadastral net income of arable land, the
Gold Crown Value, is the basis for compensation. 2 Unlike
its predecessor, the Second Compensation Law addresses
takings of movable property, in addition to those of real estate,
businesses, and agricultural land."'
Loss of property or its part valued up to HUF 200,000
($2,100) is compensated in full; the part of the loss above HUF
200,000 is compensated on a sliding scale. Compensation may
not exceed HUF 5,000,000 (coupons of about $53,600 face
value) per piece of property and per former owner."4 In
supra note 9, supp. 2.
"' See First Compensation Law, supra note 8, § 4(1)-(2) and supp. 3;
Second Compensation Law, supra note 9, § 3 and supp. 3 (providing
compensation scale charts).
. See Second Compensation Law, supra note 9, § 7(3); First
Compensation Decree, supra note 8, § 6. Few claimants remember the
precise number of employees of lost businesses. Interview with Dr. Otto
Sziraki of Eorsi & Partners, in Budapest, Hungary, Mar. 26, 1992
[hereinafter Sziraki Interview]. 'Dr. Sziraki is a Hungarian lawyer
specializing in compensation issues.
112 First Compensation Law, supra note 8, § 13(1). The Golden Crown
Value is a measure of the land's productive potential which originated in the
19th Century.
113 Second Compensation Law, supra note 9, § 3 and supp. 3.
114 First Compensation Law, supra note 8, § 4(3); Second Compensation
Law, supra note 9, § 1(2). Hence, where one piece of property (e.g., a
company) had several owners their individual compensation may not add up
to over HUF 5,000,000. Similarly, where one owner may claim




addition to the compensation coupons, a successful claimant is
entitled to options on his or her one-time property in the
course of privatization."5
Compensation Coupons are transferable bearer securities,
most of which pay interest for three years calculated from the
first day of the quarter year of issue."' The coupons may be
used to buy stock in companies undergoing privatization;
however, they may not exceed ten percent of the balance sheet
assets of most privatizing companies."'
The first version of the First Compensation Law allowed
restitution of agricultural property and set a higher full
compensation ceiling for such property than the HUF 200,000
ceiling applicable to all other types of nationalized assets. The
Hungarian Constitutional Court struck down these provisions,
first because they would have deprived existing agricultural
cooperatives of their property without expropriation
proceedings or adequate compensation, and second, because
the provisions discriminated against former owners of non-
agricultural property."8
together may not exceed the same limit.
"' First Compensation Law, supra note 8, § 9; First Compensation
Decree, supra note 8, § 15 (notification); see also discussion of special
provisions with respect to agricultural land, supra note 112 and
accompanying text.
"' The interest rate on the coupons is seventy-five percent of the Central
Bank's basic interest rate. First Compensation Law, supra note 8, § 5(2)-(5).
Under the Second Compensation Law, the interest rate on the coupons is to
be calculated from the day the First Compensation Law came into effect,
independent of the date of issue. Second Compensation Law, supra note 9,
§ 5. Politicians and commentators have expressed concerns about the
possible effects of a secondary market in Compensation Coupons on the
country's fragile financial system and its skyrocketing inflation. See
Parliamentary Debate on Restitution in Hungary, MTI Econews, Feb. 5,
1991, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File; Eorsi Interview,
supra note 36. For information on the developing secondary market in
Compensation Coupons, see infra note 198 and accompanying text.
"1 The State Property Agency which administers the privatization
process has discretion to raise these ceilings on a case by case basis. First
Compensation Law, supra note 8, § 8(2)-(4).
uS Az Alkotmanybirosag 16/1991. (IV.20.). Magyar Kozlony 1991/42.
szam; see also Compensation Act Anti-constitutional, Constitutional Court
Rules, MTI Econews, May 29, 1991, available in LEXIS, World Library,
ALLWLD File; Compensation Law Passed, supra note 108; Court Bars Land
Move, Facts on File, Oct. 26, 1990, at 800; Laszlo Mesko, Yes, No, Maybe,
HUNGARIAN OBSERVER, Jan., 1991, available in LEXIS, World Library,
ALLWLD File.
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A new version of the law reformulated the objectionable
provisions and created options for former farmland owners, to
be exercised at auctions of the land they had owned. Members
of agricultural cooperatives and residents of villages holding
Compensation Coupons are entitled to similar options on the
agricultural land in their locality. Based on claim notifications
they receive from compensation offices, state farms and
agricultural cooperatives must set aside a certain proportion
of their land to enable the exercise of all such options.
Furthermore, those former owners who register as
"agricultural entrepreneurs" may receive additional
compensation over and above the HUF 200,000 ceiling as
"agricultural enterprise support" payable in special vouchers
which may also be used in land auctions." 9 Together with
the Compensation Coupons, such vouchers may not exceed the
face value of HUF 1,000,000 or the full value of lost
agricultural property. Claimants who recover agricultural
land must keep it under cultivation for at least five years after
the purchase. 20
3.3.3. Subjects Of Reprivatization
Only natural persons may claim compensation under any
of the compensation laws. However, former co-owners,
partners or shareholders of confiscated companies may claim
compensation in proportion to their share in the company at
the time of the taking.' 2'
Where the former owner is dead, the descendants or the
surviving spouse of the former owner may claim
The court also struck down a provision which allowed claims on local
government authorities for effective restitution of public housing.
Compensation Act Anti-constitutional, Constitutional Court Rules, supra.
"' First Compensation Law, supra note 8, § 24.
'20 First Compensation Law, supra note 8, §§ 13-28; First Compensation
Decree, supra note 8, §§ 20, 23-52 (concerning set-asides and farmland
auctions). Although the Gold Crown Value is measured at HUF 1000/golden
crown for the purposes of issuing Compensation Coupons, it may not fall
below HUF 500/golden crown in the course of an auction. The initial
bidding price at farmland auctions is set at HUF 3,000/golden crown. First
Compensation Law, supra note 8, § 22(1).
' First Compensation Law, supra note 8, § 4(4); First Compensation




compensation."z  However, if any of the descendants are
also dead, the surviving descendants do not share in the
deceased descendants' compensation entitlement.1 ' A
surviving spouse is only entitled to claim compensation if the
former owner leaves no surviving descendants, and if that
spouse was married to and living with the former owner both
at the time of the expropriatioii and at the time of his or her
death.'"
Unlike all but one of the Czech and Slovak laws and unlike
the more successful of the Polish initiatives, the Hungarian
compensation program allows claims by non-nationals and
non-residents of Hungary. Foreign citizens and residents are
entitled to claim compensation if they were Hungarian citizens
at the time of the taking, if the taking was effected in
connection with stripping them of their Hungarian citizenship,
or if they were residents in Hungary on December 31,
1990.125 Foreign and national claims are treated equally
under Hungarian law.
21
The state is the only formally obliged entity under the
Hungarian compensation program. 27  All Compensation
Coupons are issued by the state and may be used to buy
shares in state companies, state-owned real estate or state
farmland.121 In fact, preferred acquisition rights granted to
former owners in assets undergoing privatization create duties
on local administrations, cooperatives and similar
organizations, and diminish the entitlements of other natural
persons.2 9
* First Compensation Law, supra note 8, § 2(2)-(4).
123 For example, where the deceased former owner leaves behind four
children and he would have been entitled to HUF 4,000 in compensation,
each of his children is entitled to HUF 1,000. If one of the children dies
without issue, the surviving children still only get HUF 1,000 each. This
reduces the total compensation payable by the state on the lost property to
HUF 3,000. The same logic applies to claims by grandchildren, etc.
124 First Compensation Law, supra note 8, § 2(2)-(4).
s First Compensation Law, supra note 8, § 2(1).
12I,1
127 Id. § 7(1).
128 Id. §§ 5-9.
129 See supra note 111-13; see also, infra note 195 and accompanying text.
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3.3.4. Procedures and Institutions
A former brothel in Budapest houses the Hungarian
National Compensation Office.' The National Office has a
president and a staff of 500 which oversees local offices
throughout the country. Under the compensation laws, the
national office may hear appeals of local office decisions.''
Appeals from national office rulings may be heard by a civil
court of first instance. 32
For the most part, and particularly where real estate is
concerned, claims are filed with the compensation office of the
region where the property is located. Alternatively, some
applicants may file with the office at their place of residence.
Foreign claimants generally apply to the Budapest
compensation office. Where several offices have overlapping
jurisdiction, the claimant may select from among the eligible
offices. 33
The compensation laws provide for form applications
containing property description, proof of nationalization, proof
of ownership at the time of nationalization, and for spouses
and descendants of former owners, proof of relationship to the
victim.
T3
With few modifications, compensation offices operate under
the national administrative code. However, aside from the
limited evidentiary and valuation guidelines contained in the
First Compensation Decree, specific criteria for claim review
are lacking. As a result, even lawyers who specialize in filing
compensation claims are uncertain about what happens to
applications once they disappear behind the doors of
compensation offices. 35
"" A compensation claim on the building is pending. Szendrei, supra
note 6.
131 First Compensation Law, supra note 8, § 10(1).
132 Id. §§ 10(1), 10(3), 11(2)-(4).
Id § 11(2)-(4).
13 First Compensation Decree, supra note 8, §§ 1, 17(1) and supp.; First
Compensation Law, supra note 8, §§ 2-4, incorporated by reference in
Second Compensation Law, supra note 9, art. 1(2); see also First
Compensation Law, supra note 8, Application Forms A, F, V and H.
1 See Styczek, supra note 15; Sziraki Interview, supra note 111. But
see First Compensation Decree, supra note 8, §§ 1-19. The Second
Compensation Law, supra note 9, § 7(4), charges the government with





3.4.1. Grounds For Redress
The legal status of past nationalizations has been a key
point of difference between the more successful Polish
initiatives and those of the former CSFR and Hungary. The
1991 Government Bill, and the 1992 Coalition of Three Bill
would have repealed some nationalization acts and decrees
and declared takings under others presumptively illegal.
However, most claimants would have had to prove that their
deprivations violated the laws of the People's Republic of
Poland in force at the time of nationalization. 3 6 Thus,
giving contemporary effect to socialist state laws has been one
of the most controversial aspects of Poland's reprivatization
debate.3 7
The position of the bill introduced by the Suchocka
government in the winter of 1993 with regard to this issue is
not clear from the available press reports. It appears from two
such reports that the recent bill has switched to a cut-off dates
approach similar to that employed by Hungary. For example,
nationalizations between 1944 and 1960 effected under listed
regulations are presumed illegal.3 8 It is unclear whether
that bill also contained a catch-all provision allowing claims
for all manner of property injustices suffered under state
socialism similar to the provisions used by the major laws of
the former CSFR. To some extent, Articles 156, 158 and 160
already provide such a safety net.3 9
Law IV of 1957 (the Code of Administrative Procedure), cited in First
Compensation Law, supra note 8, § 12(5)-(6).
'" See Reprivatization Bill, art. 2 (as discussed in Goralczyk Interview,
supra note 6); see also the proposal by Coalition of Three, in Pawlak
Addresses Sejm, supra note 14; Sejm Discusses Draft Laws on
Reprivatization, supra note 14; compare 1991 Government Bill, supra note
12, arts. 34(5), 38 with art. 2(1) and with art. 2(2)(1) and (2), respectively,
for the three options. See Styczek, supra note 15.
13 See Krzysztof Fronczak, Controversial Re-Privatization Bill:
Goralczyk Interview, Vice-Minister of Privatization, Polish News Bulletin,
Dec. 20, 1991, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File.
" Re-privatization Law on Home Stretch, supra note 13; To Whom 250
Trillion Zloty, supra note 13.
13 For reports of the Suchocka government bill, see supra note 13. For
claims under the Administrative Code, see Returned to Owner, supra note
13.
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Compensation for property left outside Poland's current
borders after the country's massive "shift" west following a
World War II settlement was a contentious topic of the recent
battle of reprivatization bills. The 1991 Government Bill, the
1992 Coalition of Three Bill, and the Suchocka Government
Bill all offered to grant such compensation. 40  However,
some Polish government officials have alleged that by virtue
of earlier treaties with Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine, all
signed in the 1950s, the Polish government has already paid
some compensation to the Poles whose property was ceded to
the former Soviet Union. 4 ' Earlier Polish bills, as well as
the laws of the Czech and Slovak Republics and Hungary,
suggest two possible solutions when full or partial
compensation has been paid: first, the invalidation of all
claims, however partially compensated, or second, an award of
additional compensation which, together with any sums
already paid out, would not exceed maximum compensation
allowed by the law.'
3.4.2. Remedies
The Suchocka Government Bill thus presents the latest of
the regular restitution-compensation swings in the long
succession of Polish reprivatization bills. The 1991
Government Bill provided for presumptive voucher
compensation and restitution when it was first introduced in
the summer of 1991. In certain instances, capital voucher
compensation was to be combined with pre-emptive purchase
140 See Pawlak Addresses Sejm, supra note 13 (In the spring of 1992, two
competing legislative proposals agreed on compensating displaced Poles.);
Re-privatization Law on Home Stretch, supra note 13 (concerning the
Suchocka Government Bill); cf. 1991 Government Bill, supra note 12, art.
2(2)(3) (Successful claimants under this "displaced Poles" provision were to
receive cash compensation from the state.). But cf. accounts of a recent
government bill, defeated in August, which opposed compensation for
property lost at border settlements. Council of Ministers Meets, supra note
14; Reprivatization Bill Ready Soon, supra note 14; Reprivatisation Debate,
supra note 14.
On the significence of Poland's post-war border shift see, e.g., THAD P.
ALTON, POLISH PosTwAR ECONOMY 22 (1955).
141 Some Reprivatization Claims Could Be Invalidated, supra note 13.




rights at privatization auctions. 43 Several months after that
bill was introduced, the parliament rejected the voucher
scheme and mandated that compensation not in kind be in
cash.'" The bill lapsed in the winter of 1992. In the spring
of 1992, a new government bill and a parliamentary initiative
included presumptive restitution, substitute awards in kind,
and compensation in interest-bearing securities to consenting
claimants only."4
By November 1992, the pendulum had swung back; the
Polish parliament rejected restitution, but withheld final
judgment on the Coalition of Three Bill which favored
compensation in securities with restitution as an exceptional
measure. 4  The Suchocka Government Bill, favoring
restitution, was introduced less than three months later.
The Suchocka Government Bill provided for presumptive
restitution, awards of substitute property similar to those
offered by the Federal Land Law of the CSFR, and where such
remedies are impossible, for compensation in interest-free
government securities. The securities would be bearer
instruments valid for five years from the date of issue. They
would be exchangeable for shares in privatizing
companies. 47 All recent bills bar restitution of property in
specified categories of public use (e.g., public welfare, national
heritage), as well as most property held by natural
persons. 48  The Suchocka Government Bill allowed
restitution of agricultural cooperative property only with the
consent of the cooperatives. 49 In such cases, substitute
in-kind awards were offered to successful claimants.
According to a senior government privatization official,
43 1991 Government Bill, supra note 12, arts. 6-19.
144 See Fronczak, supra note 137.
14 See Deputies Present Reprivatisation Bill, supra note 14;
Reprivatisation Debate, supra note 14.
14 Se Parliamentary Affairs in Brief. Sejm Session Reviews
Amendments to Patents, Banking and Tax Law, supra note 14; Pawlak
Addresses Sejm, supra note 14. In some cases, compensation recipients
would also have preemptive purchase rights in privatizing factories. See
Goralczyk Interview, supra note 6.4 Reprivatization Law on Home Stretch, supra note 13.
141 See supra notes 12, 13; Reprivatization Law on Home Stretch, supra
note 13.
14 See Returned to Owner, supra note 13.
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property for substitute awards would likely be selected from
assets that are "difficult to privatize," 5 ' which presumably
stands for undesirable.
Under the Suchocka Government Bill, restitution of
farmland is limited to 100 hectares, and forest land is limited
to 25 hectares.151
3.4.3. Subjects Of Reprivatization
Most Polish bills have allowed claims only by natural
persons, although as in the Czech and Slovak Republics and
Hungary, co-owners usually are entitled to proportional
remedies. Award of remedies to co-owners and their heirs is,
of course, more difficult to administer in the context of
restitution than in the context of compensation."5 2 Several
bills rejected in 1992 explicitly provided for remedies to
companies with headquarters in Poland at the time of
nationalization. 5 ' Most bills have also provided for awards
to heirs of former owners. 54
The Suchocka Government Bill, like the Coalition of Three
Bill and the 1991 Government Bill, required claimants to be or
become citizens and residents of Poland.1 5 The Suchocka
Government Bill also required proof of Polish citizenship at
the time of nationalization.'56  Although several 1992
initiatives would have honored foreign citizens' claims, the
more successful bills have not included such measures, and
1 See Goralczyk Interview, supra note 6. Furthermore, every bill
proposed in Poland last year contained broad exceptions for property which
served strategic or other public use functions (including welfare, education,
cultural and historical landmarks). See supra notes 13 and 14. Cf. Large
Federal Restitution Law, supra note 8, art. 8; 1991 Government Bill, supra
note 12, arts. 24, 27, 35.
151 Re-privatization Law on Home Stretch, supra note 13; Poland Draws
Up Plans To Return Seized Property, supra note 13.
'" See 1991 Government Bill, supra note 12, arts. 6, 7; Goralczyk
Interview, supra note 6.
" See New Restitution Proposals, supra note 14; Reprivatisation Debate,
supra note 14.
1' See Goralczyk Interview, supra note 6; cf. 1991 Government Bill,
supra note 12, art. 6(1).
1' See Deputy Minister on Conditions for Restoration of Nationalized
Properties, supra note 13; Pawlak Addresses Sejm, supra note 14; 1991





have faced no serious challenges in Poland with respect to the
exclusion of foreign claims.'57
Under the Suchocka Government .Bill, state entities,
including local government authorities and enterprises, are
liable to turn over property to successful claimants.'5 8 It has
already been mentioned that cooperatives may not be
compelled to restitute their property to former owners, unless
they consent to the transfer. The Polish state would issue all
compensation securities, redeemable for shares in its property
undergoing privatization. 5 ' Natural persons and foreign-
owned entities lawfully holding claimed property at the time
of the law's passage may not be made liable for restitution or
compensation under most initiatives.' One of the bills
defeated in 1992 provided for a National Reprivatization Fund,
containing property, stocks and government securities for
reprivatization awards.'61
It appears that unlike the Large Federal Restitution Law
of the CSFR, the Suchocka Government Bill does not protect
tenants on leased property. 62
3.4.4. Claims Procedures and Institutions
Most Polish initiatives designate central and regional
administrative authorities to adjudicate reprivatization
claims.' Despite a few insignificant exceptions, claims
1" The rejected Polish initiatives which provided equal rights for
foreigners excluded citizens of states at war with Poland in 1939-45, unless
they had been forcibly expelled by the Polish government. Such provisions
would have allowed restitution to Polish emigres and to Germans expelled
from Poland after World War II, and thereby would have modified the
nationalist aspect of Polish reprivatization. See supra note 54 and
accompanying text. However, because the rejected bills conditioned
restitution on repeal of specific laws, they did not address certain ethnic
minority (primarily Jewish) claims because the relevant expropriation
decrees were omitted from the text, and thus would have remained in force.
See New Restitution Proposals, supra note 14; Reprivatisation Debate, supra
note 14.
15 See Returned to Owner, supra note 13; Poland Draws Up Plans to
Return Seized Property, supra note 13.
158 Id.
10 See Turek, supra note 13.
161 See Reprivatisation Debate, supra note 14.
'" See Returned to Owner, supra note 13.
168 In Poland, existing administrative authorities appear to be charged
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would be filed in the administrative office of the region where
the property is located. Such offices would operate under the
Polish Code of Administrative Procedure.'" Most initiatives
also provide for administrative and judicial review of
reprivatization decisions."6 5  In this respect, a
reprivatization law would provide a welcome relief for the
ministries, local governments and courts now inundated with
claims under the Administrative Code.'" The 1991
Government Bill provided for form applications containing
property description, proof of nationalization, proof of
ownership at the time of nationalization, and for heirs of
former owners, proof of relationship to the victim."'
3.5. Comparison of The Reprivatization Laws
Most reprivatization initiatives use a combination of cut-off
dates and lists of repealed laws to enable restitution and
compensation claims. The Czech and Slovak federal
legislation was remarkable in that it contained broad catch-all
provisions which could be used to invalidate most takings
effected under state socialism. At the other extreme, some of
the recent Polish initiatives have proposed to keep state
socialist nationalizations presumptively legal and, with few
exceptions, to redress only those takings which violated the
with adjudicating reprivatization claims under the terms of the pending bill.
See Goralczyk Interview, supra note 6; see also First Compensation Law,
supra note 8, §§ 10-11, (also incorporated by reference in the Second
Compensation Law); Second Compensation Law, supra note 9, §6; cf. 1991
Government Bill, supra note 12, arts. 10-11.
16 See First Compensation Law, supra note 8; Pawlak Addresses Sejm,
supra note 14; cf 1991 Government Bill, supra note 12, art. 9; Styczek,
supra note 15; Sziraki Interview, supra note 111. But see First
Compensation Decree, supra note 8, §§ 14-22 (setting out more detailed,
though still vague, notice and valuation procedures to guide compensation
offices). The Second Compensation Law, supra note 9, § 7(4), charges the
government with setting down procedures for the law's implementation; see
also Hungary's Law IV of 1957 cited in First Compensation Law, supra note
8, § 12(5)-(6).
16 See PawlakAddresses Sejm, supra note 14; cf. 1991 Government Bill,
supra note 12, art. 10.
1" See Lawsuits Connected with Economic Activity Prevail in Courts,
supra note 15; Poland Outlines Reprivatization Plans, supra note 13;
Returned to Owner, supra note 13.




laws of the People's Republic of Poland.
Remedies available range from presumptive restitution
under the Czech and Slovak programs and the most recent
Polish government bill, to partial compensation under the
Hungarian program. In this respect, the differences among
the programs, however great, are of degree: all have
negotiated a mix of cash and voucher compensation, options,
and actual abd substitute restitution.
Few successful initiatives have allowed cash compensation
on any significant scale. The cash compensation provided for
by the Czech and Slovak legislation is limited to about $1,000
per claimant, and is available to former owners only, and not
to otherwise entitled heirs. Furthermore, these laws allow
compensation in state securities. The Hungarian laws may
compensate to a greater level by permitting former owners to
exercise options to buy back their one-time property through
compensation vouchers. The" securities to be issued as
compensation range from Hungary's interest-bearing, freely
transferable and widely traded Compensation Coupons, to the
interest-free vouchers of Poland's Suchocka Government Bill.
There have been proposals to restrict the transferability of the
latter vouchers which were proposed as bearer securities in the
original bill.' With respect to restitution to individual
claimants, most initiatives limit the amount of land which can
be restituted to one claimant. However, the federal
government of Czechoslovakia removed one such limit,
originally set in its Federal Land Law.
All of the reprivatization programs discussed above
eliminate or reduce compensation by the amount paid by
previous national or foreign governments. Where restitution
is appropriate, all programs mandate the return of previously
paid compensation." 9 Hungary's Second Compensation Law
may be the only exception to the general rule: it appears that
Jews who received compensation from Germany may still
16 See Returned to Owner, supra note 13.
16 Federal Land Law, supra note 8, §§ 6(4), 16; Large Federal
Restitution Law, supra note 8, art. 13; Small Federal Restitution Law, supra
note 7, art. 14(2); First Compensation Law, supra note 8, §§ 3-4; cf 1991
Government Bill, supra note 12, art. 8. Under a recent Polish bill, former
owners who may claim compensation under bilateral treaties between
Poland and their country of residence are excluded from reprivatization.
See Reprivatisation Debate, supra note. 14.
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make claims under that law. However, Jews compensated
under certain post-war acts of the Hungarian government may
not claim under the Second Compensation Law.170
All of the reprivatization initiatives generally bypass or
subordinate the claims of ethnic minorities, most of which had
been expropriated in succession prior to the relevant cut-off
dates (usually, the first session of the Communist parliament
in each country). In the Czech and Slovak Republics,
restitution laws fail to address the claims of Jews, ethnic
Germans and Hungarians; in Hungary and Poland, the laws
ignore or subordinate the claims of expropriated Jews and
Germans. While Hungary's Second Compensation Law and
the Czech Restitution Law constitute a partial attempt to
redress this imbalance, the fact remains that these two
initiatives, passed after the more general reprivatization bills,
subordinate ethnic minority claims to those made under
earlier laws, since the property in question was usually
confiscated several times from different people, and often by
different governments.171
Entitled subjects under most initiatives are natural
persons, citizens and residents of the compensating country.
The Hungarian laws allow claims by foreigners; the Small
Federal Restitution Law of the CSFR allows claims by
foreigners and private companies. Most initiatives also allow
proportional compensation of former co-owners.
A wide range of heirs and descendants are entitled to claim
under the Czech and Slovak laws where the original owner has
died. The range of eligible heirs is much narrower under
Hungary's compensation laws.
State entities are the obliged persons under most
initiatives." 2 Natural persons, foreign-owned companies,
... See Second Compensation Law, supra note 9, art. 2(3) and supp. 1;
Property Seizure Compensation to be Paid to Over One Million People, supra
note 9. But see Justice Minister Presents Bill for 1939-49 Property
Compensation, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Jan. 31, 1992, available
in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File.
171 See, e.g., Second Compensation Law, supra note 9, supp. 1; 1991
Government Bill, supra note 12, art. 6; New Restitution Proposals, supra
note 14; Reprivatisation Debate, supra note 14; Renzulli, supra note 94.
172 Federal Land Law, supra note 8, § 5; Large Federal Restitution Law,
supra note 8, art. 4; Small Federal Restitution Law, supra note 7, arts. 4-5;




and certain public organizations are usually exempted from
restitution or compensation duties. Likewise certain public
health and recreation facilities, natural reserves and national
heritage sites are exempted from restitution. Under the latest
Polish bill, agricultural cooperatives may veto restitution of
the property in their possession; no transfer may take place
without their consent. In Hungary, agricultural cooperatives
are obligated to set aside large proportions of their land for
exercise of options by former owners during farmland auctions.
All reprivatization initiatives refer to separate laws
governing property claims by churches.' To date, only
Hungary has passed a church reprivatization law.Y The
momentum for church restitution has been strong in the
predominantly catholic Slovakia and Poland. The CSFR's
Federal Assembly considered a church restitution bill in the
spring of 1992; however, the federation's imminent split had
displaced church restitution on the MPs' agenda before the
June, 1992 elections." 5 Immediately following their split on
January 1, 1993, the Czech and Slovak Republics began
debating new church restitution bills, but thus far, no law has
resulted from these debates.'76 The laws of the former CSFR
supra note 6; cf. 1991 Government Bill, supra note 12, arts. 24-26.
173 Hungary: Law XXXII of 1991, Magyar Kozlony, 1991/82.szam (1772-
1777) (on Church property restitution) [hereinafter Hungary Law XXXII];
see Federal Land Law, supra note 8, § 29; Goralczyk Interview, supra note
6; cf 1991 Government Bill, supra note 12, art. 36.
174 See Hugary Law XXXII, supra note 173; see also Gergely Fahidi, The
Meek Shall Inherit ... But the Church May Have to Settle for Less Than
Becoming Hungary's Richest Landowner Again, HUNGARIAN OBSERVER, Aug.
1991, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File; Gabor Kronstein,
Church Property Lost and Found, HUNGARIAN OBSERVER, Nov., 1990,
available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File.
175 Dienstbrier, Jr. Interview, supra note 31; Sokol Interview, supra note
6. On pressures for Church restitution in Slovakia, see Judt, supra note 19,
at 111.
17 See, e.g., Dispute Over the Restitution of Church Property Continues,
CTK National News Wire, Mar. 23, 1993, available in LEXIS, World
Library, ALLWLD File; Jewish Communities Consider 1939 Starting Line
for Restitution, CTK National News Wire, Mar. 17, 1993, available in
LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File (stating that Slovak Jewish
communities requested their expropriations be included under the pending
Church Restitution Bill); Survey of Czech Press, CTK National News Wire,
July 12, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File; Survey
of Czech Press, CTK National News Wire, Feb. 10, 1993, available in LEXIS,
World Library, ALLWLD File.
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and all Polish initiatives to date exempt property formerly
owned by the Catholic Church from privatization, pending
resolution of the Church's claims."7
The Hungarian and most Polish initiatives provide for
central and local administrative authorities to review
reprivatization claims. Under the Czech and Slovak laws,
most disputed claims are to be settled in civil courts. In all of
the documentation requirements are vague and difficult to
satisfy. Claimants may go to civil courts for declaratory
judgments on issues of past ownership and
nationalization.' s Deadlines for filing claims range from
three months to one year from the date of the applicable
law.
L7 9
4. THE INCONCLUSIVE OUTCOMES OF
REPRIVATIZATION
4.1. Introduction
Early projections and intermediate assessments of
reprivatization costs throughout the region are scarce,
inconsistent, and overwhelmingly inaccurate. The very range
of early estimates is telling; most explicitly admitted to
inaccuracy within billion-dollar error margins, as a result of
marketless valuation and erratic, undiagnosable public
sentiment. This section suggests that the implementation of
17 Federal Land Law, supra note 8, art. 29; cf 1991 Government Bill,
supra note 12, art. 36.
17 Large Federal Restitution Law, supra note 8, art. 5; Sziraki
Interview, supra note 111; cf 1991 Government Bill, supra note 12, arts. 12-
13.
... For CSFR, see Federal Land Law, supra note 8, § 6; Large Federal
Restitution Law, supra note 8, arts. 5, 7; Small Federal Restitution Law,
supra note 7, art. 13. For Hungary, see Second Compensation Law, supra
note 9, art. 6; Act L of 1991 Concerning the Amendment of Act XXV of 1991
on Partial Compensation for Damages Unjustly Caused by the State to
Properties of Citizens, in the Interests of the Settlement of Ownership
Relations (enacted Oct. 29, 1991), translated in Hungarian Rules of Law in
Force IIJ22 1714 (1991) (amending the First Compensation Law to extend
the claim deadline); First Compensation Law, supra note 8, § 11(1). For
Poland, see Goralczyk Interview, supra note 6; Pawlak Addresses Sejm,
supra note 14; cf. 1991 Government Bill, supra note 12, art. 5. On the





measures enacted so far, as well as instances of restitution
without or outside of specific enabling legislation, have not
helped to stabilize the property regime in East-Central
Europe.
4.2. The Czech and Slovak Republics
At the time of the parliamentary debates over the Large
Federal Restitution Law, Vaclav Klaus, then-Finance Minister
of the CSFR and later Prime Minister of the Czech Republic,
proclaimed: "We are convinced that if there is restitution, the
price tag is not important. It is a moral question.""s This
statement expressed a view of restitution economics which has
prevailed in the Czech Republic long after that law was
enacted.
Despite the fact that the deadlines for filing claims under
all three federal restitution laws passed over a year ago,
remarkably few figures are available to gauge the cost of
restitution in the Czech Republic. In fact, not one of the public
figures interviewed for this article in 1992, each of whom
freely volunteered in-depth opinions on the restitution
program, would offer even a ballpark estimate of its cost."8 '
The most frequently cited early estimate was $10 billion, for
the value of property eligible for restitution,8 2 of which the
total cash compensation was to be about $750 million, with
remaining claims payable in government securities0).s
The lack of detailed information is partly a function of the
person-to-person claim process peculiar to the former CSFR.
1k Green, supra note 19.
, See Czech Premier Interviewed on Natural Restitution and Financial
Compensation, supra note 24; Oldrich Sestak & Miroslav Ditrich, Session of
Federal Government Discusses Restitution Bill, BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, Feb. 9, 1991, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File
(report of a press conference with then-Deputy Federal Premier Pavel
Rychetsky noting "it is a fact that nobody today can estimate the economic
impact of restitution. It is not known exactly what property and how many
people will be involved in this."); see also Belohlavek Interview, supra note
33; Dienstbier Interview, supra note 31; Liska Interview, supra note 95;
Repik Interview, supra note 95; Sokol Interview, supra note 6; Urban
Interview, supra note 6.
," See Battiata, supra note 49; Pechota supra note 16, at 310; Sestak &
Ditrich, supra note 181. There is, however, no dearth of reports of
privatizations stalled under fraudulent restitution claims.
15 See Pechota, supra note 16, at 311.
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It may be years before all personal transfers are documented
and all lawsuits are filed, let alone adjudicated. Nonetheless,
the absence of detailed, reliable preliminary estimates is
worrisome in the context of massive restitution.
In contrast to the paucity of information regarding hard
numbers, conflicts between former owners, current owners and
foreign investors have received much publicity. Such conflicts
have been confined predominantly to the Czech Republic,
which has attracted more former owners and foreign investors
than has Slovakia.'
The sale of Rakona, the largest soap and detergent
manufacturer in the Czech Republic, to Procter and Gamble in
the fall of 1991 was among the more famous clashes between
privatization and restitution interests. The Czech government
sold Rakona before the deadline for filing restitution claims
expired and with some knowledge that its former owners, the
Otta family, were about to apply for restitution of the factory.
The $20 million sale "was hailed as a showcase transaction
proving how easy it was to do business with the Czechs on a
large scale.""a  Alleging bribery, corruption and under-
valuation, among other wrongdoings, the Otta family sued the
state for violating the restitution laws, and demanded return
of the factory. The Czech government's defense against the
family and the family's parliamentary advocates was that
Rakona was nationalized under a 1946 law, even though its
assets were not actually confiscated until after the 1948 cut-off
for restitution. Following two judicial investigations completed
in the spring and summer of 1993, a Prague court ruled that
the 1946 date was operative and the factory was not subject to
restitution. The Otta family promises to appeal the
decision."8 6
18 Similar problems also arise between former owners and domestic
investors, although these usually involve lower figures and attract less
publicity.
'" p and G Makes Nappies in Poland, Euromoney Central European,
Mar. 1, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File.
'" Id.; see, e.g., Czech Soap Plant Restitution Case Favours P&G,
Reuters, June 30, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File;
Meeting of Czech National Council: Premier Answers Complaints on Rakona
Sale, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Apr. 30, 1992, available in
LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File [hereinafter Meeting of Czech National




While the reasoning of the Rakona verdict, privileging the
date of enabling legislation over that of physical transfer, may
appear at odds with the language and legislative history of the
Large Federal Restitution Law, it looks even more
contradictory when read in conjunction with more recent
restitution initiatives. For example, the Czech Restitution
Law, which restores property to those ethnic Germans and
Hungarians, categorized as Nazi collaborators, who remained
in Czechoslovakia after their property was collectively
expropriated by President Benes' 1945 decrees, purports to
redress a post-1948 violation by the Communist government.
By measures enacted in 1948, 1949 and 1953, that government
restored Czechoslovak citizenship, but not property to those
Germans and Hungarians who had established their innocence
of Nazi war crimes. The final irony of this contradiction is
that the same official, then-Czech Premier Petr Pithart, within
the space of one week publicly indicated his support for the
classification of the German and Hungarian takings as post-
1948 and the Rakona nationalization as pre-1948.8 7
Another sordid restitution controversy features Prague's
National Gallery. The art museum is defending lawsuits
brought by the children of a well-known Czech art historian
and collector, Vincenc Kramar, for restitution of thirty
paintings, including sixteen Picassos. Kramar's daughter
applied for the return of the collection on the day of the
deadline for lodging restitution claims, alleging that her father
was persecuted by the state and coerced into handing over the
paintings. The museum contends that the gift was voluntary,
citing evidence that Kramar was a well-known socialist and
author of an early pamphlet denouncing private property in
art, and had joined the Communist Party years before it came
to power in Czechoslovakia. Meanwhile, Kramar's son, who
donated six different works from his father's collection in
exchange for a country house, has also filed a claim for
Restitution Claims against Rakona, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts,
May 4, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File; Rakona -
Restitution, CTK National Newswire, May 26, 1992, available in LEXIS,
World Library, ALLWLD File.
16 See Meeting of Czech National Council, supra note 186; Czech Premier
Interviewed on Natural Restitution and Financial Compensation, supra note
24.
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restitution of those paintings, claiming that the exchange was
coerced. Courts are still reviewing both children's claims.'
Other public accusations concern the speedy restoration of
citizenship to members of aristocratic families who are alleged
to have opted for German nationality during World War II and
are now returning to the Czech Republic, ostensibly for the
sole purpose of making restitution claims.'
Over the past year, the Slovak Republic has made public
some preliminary figures concerning its ongoing restitution
program. As might have been predicted, the relative dearth of
eligible former owners and surviving properties, as well as the
exclusion of most ethnic Hungarians from the program (based
on the date of their expropriation), has resulted in a small
number of claims, particularly in comparison to Slovakia's
neighbors. Only 6.7% of Slovakia's agricultural land was
subject to restitution claims of 107,842 people who had filed
applications by the summer of 1992. The average size of
claimed plots is also small: 1.34 hectares. 90 According to
the Slovak Ministry of Privatization statistics, 627 people had
received financial compensation by the spring of 1993. At that
time, 2,000 out of a total of 15,000 pending reprivatization
claims were for compensation. According to one press report,
"thousands" of claims had been decided affirmatively by April
1993 in a process which cost the Slovak Republic an estimated
$2.88 million.19'
A few months earlier, however, the republic's Privatization
Minister, Lubomir Dolgos, told a Slovak newspaper that
"restitution of property confiscated under the former regime to
its initial owners is slowing down [the] privati[z]ation process
considerably." 92 According to Dolgos, "[i]t was initially
18 Pandora's Cubist Box, ECONOMIST, Mar. 27, 1993, at 91.
18 Vik Criticises Speedy Return of Citizenship to Aristocrats, CTK
National News Wire, June 29, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library,
ALLWLD File.
1 " Slovak Private Sector in Early 1993, BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, June 24, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD
File; see also Chris Sulavik, Property Restitution Delivers or Defers Dreams
in Slovakia, Reuter European Business Report, Apr. 13, 1993, available in
LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File.
... See Sulavik, supra note 190.
1' Survey of Slovak Press, CTK National News Wire, Feb. 24, 1993,




believed ... that restitution would be an effective form of
privati[z]ation, but it has prove[n] to be a political
issue..."'s Dolgos' disillusionment finds echoes throughout
the region.
4.3. Hungary
In early 1991, official sources in Hungary projected the cost
of its compensation program to be between $1 billion and $2
billion. At that time, the Smallholders were calling for up to
$4 billion in land transfers under the First Compensation Law
alone.' 9 Some observers linked the growth in real estate
speculation and the sharp rise in rents to widespread
predictions of the law's first dramatic impact on property
distribution in Hungary.'95 However, such predictions of
radical redistribution failed to materialize. After a very slow
start and two more compensation laws, the results of the
compensation program have lingered at the low end of the
early official estimates.
When the First Compensation Law was enacted in April
1991, the number of potential claimants under its terms was
estimated to be between 800,000 and 2,000,000.'96 Contrary
to all expectations, however, compensation offices around the
country saw only 90,000 applicants between April and October
1991, according to press reports. The three-month claim
deadline was extended several times, apparently due to the
lack of demand. 9 '
1 3 Id.
1 See Ban, supra note 44; Celstene Bohlen, Hungarians Debate How Far
Back to Go to Right Old Wrongs, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 15, 1991 at Al; Erika
Laszlo, Crucial Property Bill Debated, UPI, Feb. 4, 1991, available in
LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File; Ministry of Finance Figures on
Financial Implications of Compensation, supra note 44; Parliament-
Compensation Bill, MTI Econews, Feb. 11, 1991, available in LEXIS, World
Library, ALLWLD File; On Smallholder proposals, see Parliamentary Debate
on Restitution in Hungary, supra note 116.
iS See Hungarian Property Rights Debate, supra note 6.
See id.; Peter Maass, Hungary's Compensation Promise Proves Hollow
for Many Claimants; Government Offers Bonds as Partial Payment for
Seized Property, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 1991, at A14.
" See id.; Sziraki Interview, supra note 111. Though considerably lower
than expected, the demand for compensation coupons has been noticeably
higher in the countryside than in the cities. Sziraki Interview, supra note
111.
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In February 1992, the President of Hungary's National
Compensation Office reported that his staff of 500 had issued
only 300 coupons under the First Compensation Law. By
spring of that year, the number of applications had exceeded
800,000, and was increasing at the rate of 5,000 per week. In
May 1992, the authorities were predicting an additional
200,000 to 300,000 applications under the new Second
Compensation Law.19 With new compensation laws in force,
by mid-November 1992, compensation offices had issued
coupons in an amount less than one-fifth of their latest target
of $1 billion for all three laws combined, and they expected to
issue another one-fifth during the first quarter of 1993.1,
Only two of Hungary's compensation laws addressed
expropriations; the other addressed compensation for victims
of political persecution. The same compensation offices handle
claims under all three laws. No comprehensive breakdown is
available for awards made so far under each law, and the
authorities have not provided separate estimates of the
administrative costs of compensation.
Although the last of Hungary's coupons, along with
conclusive figures, may not be available for another four years,
a vigorous secondary market has already developed in the
coupons issued thus far. Buyers ranging from stockbrokers to
department stores have been offering successful claimants
between sixty-five and one hundred percent of the face value
of their coupons in cash or goods. Buyers exchange the
coupons for shares in privatizing state companies and state-
owned real estate, or they use them to enter land auctions
where plots have been set aside for compensation
recipients.9 0
1"8 Compensation Legislation Completed in Hungary, supra note 9;
Property Seizure Compensation to be Paid to Over One Million People, supra
note 9; Michael Shields, Hungary Starts Compensating Victims of State
Property Seizures, Reuter Library Report, Feb. 20, 1992, available in LEXIS,
World Library, ALLWLD File.
199 Secondary Market Develops in Compensation Vouchers, Finance East
Europe, Nov. 19, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File.
'" Id.; see also Hungary: Complications Ahead as Co-operative Farms
Cope With Compensation Certificates and Reconstruction, Reuter Textline,
Apr. 30, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File; Scott
Powell, Eastern Europe: Capital Markets Develop with Increasing Pace,
Router Textline, Euromoney Supplement, Apr. 15, 1992, available in LEXIS,




By late 1992, compensation offices had registered
approximately 129,000 claims for agricultural land, covering
about 2 million hectares, or twenty-five percent of Hungary's
total arable land. Nevertheless, only thirty percent of these
claimants, if they succeed, are expected to use their
compensation coupons to enter land auctions.20 1
Presumably, the remaining claimants will either sell their
coupons or invest in non-agricultural enterprises.
The resulting trade in land option coupons may strain the
existing compromise between the Hungarian government and
the farming cooperatives. Under the law, the co-ops set aside
a part of their land for the government's compensation scheme
and privatize the remainder among their members. In theory,
the amount of land each collective sets aside is a function of
the number and content of claims against its land.
Compensation offices do ask collectives to authenticate claims
to their land. Nonetheless, collectives often come under orders
to set aside plots many times greater than the area
theoretically subject to such claims, in part to satisfy multiple
claims against each parcel of land that was expropriated more
than once since 1939.202 According to one report, while all
lands held by Hungarian cooperatives are worth about 58
million Golden Crowns, claims under the First Compensation
Law alone had requested 48 million Golden Crowns in set-
asides by November 1992.203 In such circumstances,
cooperatives are not likely to welcome commercial buyers of
Compensation Coupons exercising options to buy the
cooperatives' land.
4.4. Poland
Poland's first reprivatization bill was rejected in part for its
lack of estimates concerning the extent and cost of proposed
redistributions. The early debates that followed the bill's
rejection produced program cost estimates varying between $6
billion and $20 billion, with most hovering around $10 billion,
" Hungary - Agricultural Equipment, 1992 Nat'l Trade Date Bank
Market Reports, Nov. 13, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library,
ALLWLD File.
202 See id.
2" Id. Note that in addition to cooperatives, state farms must also set
aside land for compensation.
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one-half of Poland's 1991 budget.2 More recent estimates
narrowed this range to $12 billion to $15 billion."' In 1990
Poland's provincial authorities received approximately 70,000
reprivatization claims," 6 the vast majority of which were for
land.2" In 1991, the total number of claims doubled.2"
Just under 60,000 of the 1991 claims were for land ceded to
the former Soviet Union following World War II.209 In 1991
and 1992 combined, 87,711 claims were made to local
government offices, with 68,754 of them regarding lands lying
beyond Poland's current borders.210
Although not as popular as local governments, Poland's
ministries are another favored target for reprivatization
claims. Claims against ministries are raised under Articles
156 and 158 of Poland's Code of Administrative Procedure. If
a ministry declares a claim invalid under Articles 156 or 158,
a former owner m'ay seek compensation in court under Article
160 of the code.21 Due to the Suchoka government strategy
stressing the low cost of a reprivatization program as
compared with the existing default procedure, the details of
the administrative claims have been remarkably well
publicized. 212  The following is a summary of the claims
against ministries as of May 1993:
20 Goralczyk Interview, supra note 6. For early figures see Fronczak,
supra note 137; Reprivatisation Barriers, Polish News Bulletin, Mar. 8,
1991, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File; Reprivatization for
Former Owners, East European Business Law, Sept., 1991, available in
LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File.
' See Demand for Restitution of Confiscated Property in Warsaw, supra
note 15.
'" Id. Many press reports suggest discrepancies in the estimates. For
example, an official of the Reprivatization Office, a government agency set
up to receive claims in the absence of a law, said in an interview last August
that she alone received over 100,000 claims from Poles "at home and
abroad." See Turek, supra note 15.
207 Styczek, supra note 15.
... Demand for Restitution of Confiscated Property in Warsaw, supra note
15.
Reprivatisation Law Drafted, Reuter Textline: Euromoney Central
European, Sept. 1, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File.
But see Returned to Owner, supra note 13.
2 0 Returned to Owner, supra note 13.
211 Id.




I. Ministry of Agriculture and Food Management
Four thousand six hundred twenty claim applications, with
eighty positive decisions under Article 156, valued at z1 60
billion. Seventy one negative decisions. Additional
decisions by individual ministers: twenty-seven. Sixty-
four of the negative decisions were appealed in the Main
Administrative Court. The courts thus far have sanctioned
compensation payments of zl 1.5 billion for Article 160
claims lodged with this ministry.
I. Ministry of Industry and Trade
Two thousand five hundred claim applications, with 384
positive decisions under Article 156, and four positive
decisions under Article 158. The positive rulings are
valued at zl 1 trillion. Seventeen negative decisions under
Article 156. Additional decisions by individual ministers:
fifty-six. Thirty-three of the negative decisions were
appealed in the Main Administrative Court. The courts
thus far have received 190 Article 160 claims, worth zl 1.5
trillion.
III. Ministry of Environmental Protection
Three hundred sixty seven claim applications, two positive
decisions under Article 156, valued at zl 1.5 billion.
Twenty five negative decisions. Four of the negative
decisions were appealed in the Main Administrative Court.
Three claims were forwarded to the Ministry of Agriculture
and Food Management.
IV Ministry of Physical Planning and Construction
Four hundred forty one claim applications, two hundred
ten positive decisions under Article 158, and one positive
decision under Article 158 valued at zl 20 billion. Four
negative decisions under Article 156. Additional decisions
by individual ministers: eleven. Six of the negative
decisions were appealed in the Main Administrative Court.
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V Ministry of Ownership Transformations (Privatization)
Six thousand eighty two claims, valued at over zl 374
trillion."i
Furthermore, the ministries have suspended the issuance
of 770 decisions and the review of 7,436 pending applications
due to lack of funds.214 Faced with the real dilemma of
proliferating claims in the absence of a reprivatization law,
most ministries echo the Agricultural Ministry official who
vowed that he would not "write out checks that are going to
bounce."215 The parliament has been slow to legislate a
reprivatization law in part for the same concerns; there is no
realistic budget that could accommodate even a fraction of the
restitution requests.2 16 Despite this stalemate, the local
governments and ministries continue to press the parliament
to pass a law which distributes the burdens and reduces the
costs of claim administration.217
The refusal of Poland's parliament to act and the
reluctance of the Polish courts to declare post-war
nationalizations illegal absent legislative action have prompted
many who favor reprivatization, including President Walesa,
to take extraordinary measures of dubious legality. For
example, after Poland's Supreme Administrative Court ruled
against returning a small cast-iron foundry to its pre-war
owner in the spring of 1992, Walesa summoned the court's
president to a "stormy" meeting in his office and fired him.1
The court overturned its ruling shortly thereafter, and
returned the foundry to its former owner in what the press
reported to be the first case of successful reprivatization in
13 The last figure does not account for 1993 applications. Returned to
Owner, supra note 13. For earlier estimates, see Compensation for
Confiscated Property Could Cost zl 200,000 bn, Reuter Textline, May 26,
1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File; Reprivatisation
Claims Total 15 bn Dollars, PAP Polish Press Agency, May 23, 1992,
available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File.
1
14 Returned to Owner, supra note 13.
215 Styczek, supra note 15.
216 1d.
2171 d.
218 Krzysztof Leski, Euro Business: Poland Returns Ill-Gotten Gains,





In the summer of 1992, a descendant of an aristocratic
family hired twenty armed men to storm a 19th century villa
which had belonged to her ancestors and was being used as an
adult-education college. The little army bolted the doors and
gates of the house, and raised a sign reading "Private
Property. Entry strictly forbidden-Owner."2 20  Similar but
less dramatic instances of self-help throughout the country
have led to increased caution on the part of real estate
investors in Poland.221
This heated climate of Polish reprivatization has bred
intense debate and accusations from both sides. One incident
has even led to a libel suit by Poland's Privatization Minister
Janusz Lewandowski against the Polish Union of Real Estate
Owners. 2  Lewandowski sought an apology and
compensation from the union, because their spokesman called
the state privatization program "fencing" (a Polish Penal Code
term for resale of stolen goods) and Lewandowski a criminal.
The suit came before a Warsaw court in the spring of 1992,
and at this time there are no reports of a verdict.223
4.5. Conclusion
As public enthusiasm for reprivatization wanes in East-
Central Europe, so do the chances of achieving massive
uniform compensation, let alone the restoration of post-war
property holding patterns. Given the costly and destabilizing
claims generated by reprivatization laws, it is even more
doubtful that any of these laws could bring about the
enterprise safety necessary to create a market economy or the
conditions required to improve "care of farm and forest land
1' Id.; see also Brief Mix, PAP Polish Press Agency, May 22, 1992,
available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File. The Polish press
reported that unspecified administrative decisions now enable the
restitution of property that was taken in violation of the laws in force at
that time. Such reports do not indicate whether the property was in fact
returned to former owners. See Buczek & Grzedzinski, supra note 15.
""' Julian Borger, Raiders Show Polish Nobles How to Recover Their
Homes, GUARDIAN, July 24, 1993 at 13.
2 Id.
2, Lewandowski Demands Apology, Polish News Bulletin, Mar. 9, 1991,
available in LEXIS, World Library, AILWLD File.
1 3 ICL
1993]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
[by] renewing the original relations of ownership of land" to
which their preambles aspire.2 ' It now appears that the
redistribution that would take place under the reprivatization
programs would be erratic, and that its symbolic and
emotional significance far exceeds any foreseeable economic or
social impact.2 5
5. CONCLUSION
The early champions of reprivatization seemed to know and
care little about the actual distributive results of their
programs. Regardless of their outcome, these programs
epitomize their advocates' ideologies and, to the extent they
are enacted, the ideologies of the region's new governments.
These new governments assure the ideological intensity for
their projects when they claim to be polar opposites of the
deposed socialist regimes, associated with "the overall
nationalization of everything, including people's minds,
historical knowledge, every means of communication [and] all
human relationships."22
As the Eastern Bloc collapsed, the term "nationalization"
came to stand for imprisonment: the suspension of national
history, severance from the world, poverty, loss of identity, and
colonization by the East. Not surprisingly, "privatization" has
come to symbolize liberation, prosperity, and the West. The
idea of "re-privatization" binds the outcome of privatization to
particular visions of continuity, national history, identity, and
suggests a re-union with Western Europe by "restoring the
European system of values and form of behavior, self-
24 See Federal Land Law, supra note 8, pmbl.; First Compensation Law,
supra note 8, pmbl. The parliamentary debates at the time of the laws'
introduction of the Federal Land Law resolved the restitution of 11.6 million
acres, seventy percent of all land. Prague Debates Bill That Would Privatize
Land, Eastern Europe Report, Apr. 8, 1991, available in LEXIS, World
Library, ALLWLD File. Nonetheless, enthusiasm for restitution has waned
even in the Czech lhnds. See Dienstbier Interview, supra note 31; Sokol
Interview, supra note 6; Urban Interview, supra note 6;.
22 Even those politicians who favor reprivatization seem'to be aware
that any restitution or compensation after fifty years of Communist rule
would be partial and unsystematic. Hence, they repeat caveats on the
impossibility of doing adequate justice by former owners.




confidence and faith." '27 Thus, reprivatization appears as a
natural formulation of post-Communist nation-building
aspirations.
Throughout the region, the fate of reprivatization
initiatives is a function of the interplay between the
nationalist-right forces advocating restitution and the
technocrats and left-wing politicians opposing all
reprivatization.
The Czech and Slovak Republics continue to implement the
sweeping restitution program enacted in the former CSFR in
1990 and 1991. Restitution appeared accessible to Czech
legislators because in 1990 Czechoslovakia's foreign debt was
low and its privatization program lagged behind its
counterparts in other countries. The apparent health of the
economy diffused the technocrats' warnings of restitutions
detrimental economic impact. Furthermore, the left-wing
politicians and their traditional positions lacked credibility in
Prague following the abrupt surrender of Czechoslovakia's
Communists in 1989 after two decades of particularly
conservative rule.
Although both the technocrat and the left arguments
reached poorer Slovakia with greater success, membership in
the CSFR at the time of the laws' enactment most likely
determined the Slovak restitution program. To date,
restitution claims in Slovakia are far fewer than in the Czech
Republic.
Beginning in 1991, Hungary enacted a very limited voucher
compensation scheme for former owners. The restricted nature
of the program is largely due to the fact that, in 1990,
Hungary was a particularly fertile ground for technocrat
arguments. Fears were widespread that massive
reprivatization would interfere with the country's advanced
privatization process, jeopardize foreign investment, and
increase the foreign debt which was already the highest in the
region. The negotiated transition from state socialism,
following the economic reforms and relatively mild politics of
... Hungarian Premier Jozsef Antall Presents Government Programme,
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 25, 1990, available in LEXIS,
World Library, ALLWLD File (hailing the return of independence, "economic
turnabout," a market economy, complete national renewal, and a return to
Europe).
1993]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
the last twenty years of the Hungarian People's Republic,
helped avoid an anti-Communist eruption as had occurred in
Prague.228 As a result, the traditionally leftist distributive
justice arguments against restitution were not automatically
silenced in Hungary.
Poland has not yet passed a reprivatization law. For over
three years, the Polish parliament has blocked every
reprivatization bill, and some say the situation may never
change. The political influence of the working class lends
weight to contentions that reprivatization reinstates an
illegitimate distributive regime. The ten-year-long transition
from state socialism to Solidarity, the uninterrupted private
ownership of agriculture under the Communist governments,
Poland's high inflation rate and foreign debt, and the
widespread concern over stumbling privatization and foreign
investment to date have helped tilt the political balance in
favor of the left and the technocrats, and against
reprivatization.
The initiatives enacted thus far have had at best negligible
uncertain, and possibly destabilizing, effects on the concurrent
economic reform programs. The lack of clearly delineated
claim procedures, the loss of records over the years, and in
many cases, the lack of consensus behind reprivatization,
enable restitutions and denials of claims to be based on truly
flexible readings of the laws, or even upon no laws at all.
228 See BATT, supra note 32.
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